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ABSTRACT 
Why do parties use non-binding agreements? This Article explores the role of non-
binding preliminary agreements in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals.  It provides a 
modern, comprehensive account of how and why sophisticated parties use these common 
bargaining tools, even when they have the option of using binding contracts. 
In M&A deals, parties enter into non-binding preliminary agreements, such as term 
sheets and letters of intent.  Once parties sign a non-binding agreement, they behave as 
though bound and almost always follow up with a formal contract with terms that closely 
resemble the non-binding agreement’s terms.  Scholars and courts have long treated 
preliminary agreements as contract-like tools that parties will enforce when counterparties 
breach.  This Article develops an alternative explanation for why parties use non-binding 
preliminary agreements.  These agreements are not contracts—rather, they are signposts for 
when enough momentum has accumulated that a deal has become “sticky” and is likely to 
go forward.  Although non-binding preliminary agreements are not contracts, their signaling, 
organizational, and formal functions can facilitate complex dealmaking. 
Using interviews with deal lawyers, this Article provides a rich and layered account of 
how sophisticated parties use these agreements in modern dealmaking.  Parties almost never 
disclose non-binding preliminary agreements publicly, so interviews offer a rare glimpse into 
this common, but little-understood, deal practice.  This Article also differentiates, for the 
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first time, between the formal and substantive functions of preliminary agreement-making.  
By focusing exclusively on these agreements’ contractual qualities (their substantive 
functions), scholars have overlooked their useful formal functions.  By reframing preliminary 
agreements as signposts for deal momentum, rather than as contracts, this Article highlights 
those functions, and discusses the implications of this reframing for contract theory, contract 
enforcement, and deal design. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, the Delaware Supreme Court awarded $113 million in 
expectation damages when a sophisticated party did not honor the terms of 
an unsigned, two-page preliminary agreement marked “non-binding.”1  Over 
a ten-year battle, the Delaware courts’ four decisions in SIGA Technologies Inc. 
v. PharmAthene Inc. stirred up a storm of interest from deal lawyers.2  They also 
brought to light a long-standing and puzzling practice in dealmaking: the use 
of non-binding agreements. Why do parties use non-binding agreements to 
memorialize high-stakes deals, especially when they have the option to use 
formal, binding contracts? 
Much of contract law scholarship has focused on questions of 
enforcement after a contract is breached.  The ability to sue and recover 
damages for breach of contract ex post is understood as a way to motivate 
party behavior ex ante.  In the absence of formal enforcement, informal 
                                                
 1. SIGA Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., 132 A.3d 1108 (Del. 2015); SIGA 
Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., 67 A.3d 330 (Del. 2013).  
 2. See, e.g., Andrew J. Colosimo et al., Practice Points for Term Sheets, Letters of Intent, 
and Undertakings to Negotiate in Good Faith—Based on Delaware Supreme Court’s SIGA Decision, 
FRIED FRANK: PRIVATE EQUITY BRIEFING 1 (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.friedfrank.com 
[https://perma.cc/ZVZ8-89BS] (emphasizing “the importance of clarity in a term sheet or 
letter of intent with respect to whether there is a binding obligation to negotiate in good faith 
and what the scope of that obligation is”); Patrick Klingborg, When a “Non-Binding” Letter of 
Intent Is Binding After All, LINCOLN, GUSTAFSON, & CERCOS, LLP (June 1, 2016), 
http://www.lgclawoffice.com [https://perma.cc/D84X-3F5C] (noting that Delaware’s 
decision in SIGA was “different from the California approach” and that “[t]he best practice, 
therefore, is to be sure a letter of intent accurately characterizes what you intend to negotiate 
in good faith regardless of whether the letter of intent states it is ‘non-binding’”); Philip 
Richter, Negotiation in Good Faith—SIGA v. PharmAthene, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Jan. 27, 2016), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/01/27/negotiation-in-good-faith-siga-v-pharmathene 
[https://perma.cc/HNM6-CM89] (“Based on SIGA, as a practical matter, expectation 
damages will now be a real possibility in Delaware for breaches of agreements to negotiate in 
good faith.”); Ropes & Gray LLP, Delaware Supreme Court Upholds Award of Expectation Damages 
in Breach of Contract Claim, THE ROPES RECAP: MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS LAW NEWS 10, 11 
(4th Qtr. 2015), https://www.ropesgray.com/newsroom/alerts/2016/February/The-Ropes-
Recap-Mergers-Acquisitions-Law-News.aspx [https://perma.cc/GG7D-G4Q9] (describing 
the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in SIGA and the history of the case, and noting that 
in a dissent, Justice Valihura noted that the majority’s decision “would move Delaware out of 
alignment with other major commercial jurisdictions . . . by eroding the requirement that 
damages be proved with reasonable certainty”).  
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enforcement, such as damage to one’s reputation, can also motivate deal 
parties to play by the rules.3  What little scholarship exists about preliminary 
agreements also focuses on enforcement.  Scholars have debated, for 
instance, whether a preliminary agreement (even if unsigned and marked non-
binding, and not meeting the formal definition of a contract) creates a legal 
obligation to perform, and if so, whether breaching parties should be liable 
for reliance or expectation damages.4 
But to understand whether and how to enforce preliminary agreements, 
we must first address fundamental questions: Why do sophisticated parties 
use non-binding preliminary agreements at all?  And, if these agreements are 
not binding, why do deal parties abide by their terms?  
This Article begins the inquiry from the perspective of contract design,5 
rather than enforcement, to understand the role of preliminary agreements in 
dealmaking.   
                                                
 3. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating 
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) [hereinafter 
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law] (explaining that reputation-based nonlegal sanctions create 
a powerful enforcement mechanism, essential to the function of the private legal system 
created by the cotton industry); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal 
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) [hereinafter 
Bernstein, Opting Out] (describing trade association enforcement of contractual breaches); 
Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 
5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (1989) [hereinafter Ellickson, A Hypothesis] (presenting evidence of 
informal enforcement—norms—overtaking formal enforcement in the whaling industry); 
Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 
STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986) [hereinafter Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle] (describing how rural 
cattle ranchers in Shasta County, California, abide by norms rather than rules, and how 
animal trespass disputes are settled by self-help, rather than formal legal enforcement 
mechanisms); W. Bentley MacLeod, Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement, 45 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 595 (2007) (describing the use of informal enforcement to police 
contract defaults).  
 4. See Richter, supra note 2 (“In SIGA’s case, a damages award based on reliance 
would have led to a far better economic result than it would have received from entering into 
the license agreement on the contemplated terms.  The real potential in Delaware 
for expectation damages for breach of an obligation to negotiate an agreement in good faith 
should change the calculus for a party considering whether to breach this type of 
obligation.”). 
 5. Other scholars have approached contract questions from the perspective of ex 
ante design, rather than ex post enforcement, with interesting results.  See, e.g., Albert Choi & 
George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 
YALE L.J. 848 (2010) (arguing that parties can use vague contract provisions efficiently—for 
example, material adverse change clauses in acquisition agreements may remain vague 
because they are rarely litigated); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation 
in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006) [hereinafter Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation] 
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This inquiry reveals that parties primarily use non-binding agreements to 
add formality to an otherwise murky pre-contractual deal process.  
Preliminary agreements mark the moment when deal parties have resolved 
most deal uncertainty and are likely to do a deal together, whether or not they 
sign a preliminary agreement. Instead of causing parties to behave well, 
preliminary agreements merely mark the moment when parties were already 
primed to behave well, with or without an agreement.  
Private mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals are a helpful lens through 
which to understand early-stage dealmaking.  In the early stages of a private 
M&A deal, parties often outline the material terms of their deal in a non-
binding preliminary agreement, such as a term sheet, letter of intent, or 
memorandum of understanding.6  These short agreements often list only a 
few material business terms, such as price and what is being sold, and can be 
signed or unsigned.  In some ways, these can be understood as written 
versions of handshake agreements, and resemble non-binding agreements in 
other contexts, such as engagements to be married. 
                                                
(examining the efficiency of investment in the design and enforcement phase of the 
contracting process, and arguing that parties can lower overall contracting costs by using 
vague contract terms ex ante and shifting investment to the ex post enforcement phase); 
Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 
CASE W.  RES. L. REV. 187 (2005) [hereinafter Scott & Triantis, Incomplete Contracts] 
(considering the role of litigation in motivating contract design). 
 6. See RALPH B. LAKE & UGO DRAETTA, LETTERS OF INTENT AND OTHER 
PRECONTRACTUAL DOCUMENTS: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND FORMS 5–6 (2d ed. 1994) 
(describing term sheets, letters of intent, memoranda of understanding and other 
precontractual instruments as “a precontractual written instrument that reflects preliminary 
agreements and understandings of one or more parties to a future contract”).  In the seminal 
case about preliminary agreements, Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of America v. Tribune Co., 670 
F. Supp. 491, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), Judge Pierre Leval makes a distinction between “Type I” 
preliminary agreements and “Type II” preliminary agreements.  See Ronald J. Gilson et al., 
Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, & Doctrine, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1426 n.163 (2010) (explaining that Type I agreements are those where 
the parties have agreed to material terms, but intend to follow-up with a formal, binding 
document).  This Article is concerned with Type I agreements.  But Type II agreements are 
also possible.  Type II agreements are binding preliminary agreements, where “parties agree 
on certain terms but leave potentially important terms open to further negotiation.  This 
requires courts to determine whether such an agreement had been made, what the duty to 
bargain in good faith entails, and which remedy should be awarded for breach of that duty.”  
Id.; see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 
120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 664 (2007) (describing a Type I agreement as one in which “the 
parties have agreed on all material terms and intend to memorialize this agreement in a 
formal document”). 
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Preliminary agreements in this context are, most often, not formal 
contracts: They create no binding obligation under the law.7  In fact, like the 
term sheet in SIGA, M&A preliminary agreements are often explicitly marked 
“non-binding.”  They are also not meant to be enforced when breached.8  
Uniquely, M&A parties have both the means and the sophistication to create 
binding contracts.  In fact, throughout an M&A transaction, parties repeatedly 
demonstrate their ability to create binding contracts, which they use to govern 
issues both large and small.9  Thus, these sophisticated business parties’ use of 
non-binding preliminary agreements is presumably intentional and 
considered, rather than the result of lack of resources or skills. 
Other scholars have explored the role of preliminary agreements in 
dealmaking more generally. That scholarship tends to lump preliminary 
agreements from many commercial contexts into one study, which means that 
the M&A preliminary agreement, which are somewhat of an oddball in world 
of sophisticated contracts, is overlooked.  Existing scholarship also usually 
assumes that preliminary agreements are a type of contract, and that their 
enforceability is an important part of why parties abide by them. 
Bob Scott and Alan Schwartz, for instance, examined over 100 cases 
involving preliminary agreements to determine preliminary agreements and 
how they ought to be enforced by courts.10  They argued that parties use 
preliminary agreements when substantial deal uncertainty makes it impossible 
for parties to agree to the specific terms of an intended deal. While parties 
investigate deal specifics, they enter a preliminary agreement outlining a deal 
that will later be formalized in a binding contract, or abandoned if initial 
investigations show that the deal is not viable.11  Schwartz and Scott argue 
that, to preserve preliminary agreements’ important role in efficient 
dealmaking, and to encourage parties to make relationship-specific 
                                                
 7. See Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement Dealmaking in Complex 
Mergers and Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1410 n.27 (2016) (describing an “agreement” 
as “a written bargain that might be a contract,” as contrasted with a “contract,” a “binding, 
enforceable obligation under the law”). 
 8. To the extent parties include binding and enforceable provisions, they are 
provisions related to the process of the deal, and not to the material business terms.  For 
example, provisions related to confidential exchange of information during initial 
investigation may be marked binding, and breaches may be enforceable.  However, those 
limited binding terms are carefully noted as such in the agreement. 
 9. See Hwang, supra note 7 (describing the group of contracts and agreements that 
parties enter into as an “unbundled bargain”). 
 10. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6, at 671 (describing their case survey 
methodology).  
 11. See id. at 662–63 (describing how parties enter into preliminary agreements). 
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investments in a deal prior to resolving uncertainty, courts ought to award 
reliance damages when a party breaches a preliminary agreement.12   
Albert Choi and George Triantis offer another explanation for why 
parties use preliminary agreements: to cope with deal complexity.  They argue 
that complex deals are entered into in stages—first a preliminary agreement, 
then a definitive contract—because some deals are “simply too complex or 
too time-consuming to be completed in a single stage.”13  Preliminary 
agreements allow time for parties to engage experts, such as lawyers. Those 
experts then use their expertise to fine-tune the terms of the deal and to draft 
the definitive contracts.14  Like Schwartz and Scott, Choi and Triantis note 
that by formally enforcing preliminary agreements, courts may improve deal 
efficiency.15 
While both of these explanations are compelling, they present some 
puzzles.  First, neither explains why parties commonly use non-binding 
preliminary agreements. If judicial enforcement of preliminary agreements 
motivates parties to act efficiently, why do parties go out of their way to 
indicate that they do not want judicial involvement? 
Second, neither explanation addresses why parties often behave as 
though non-binding agreements are binding.  Why do parties tend to enter 
into a definitive contract after they have signed a non-binding preliminary 
agreement?  And why does that final contract often contain terms that closely 
resemble the preliminary agreement’s initial terms? 
This Article attempts to explain the role of non-binding agreements in 
modern dealmaking.  It shows that these agreements are signposts. They mark 
a moment in the deal’s lifecycle when enough uncertainty and complexity has 
been resolved that the deal is likely to go forward, and serve signaling, 
                                                
 12. See id. at 703–04 (arguing that “courts have a further facilitative role: to 
encourage exploration of investment opportunities by protecting the promisee’s verifiable 
reliance”—in other words, by attaching contract liability to parties who breach preliminary 
agreements). 
 13. Albert Choi & George Triantis, Multi-Stage Contracting in Complex Transactions 
(Feb. 15, 2014 draft, on file with author) at 1 (noting that “some agreements are simply too 
complex . . .  to be completed in a single stage . . . . [T]he purpose of agreement in the first 
stage is to address complexity and set a distinct stage for expert agents, rather than to protect 
specific investments under an incomplete contract.”). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 5 (noting that “the court’s intervention to find a commitment in an earlier 
stage can improve the contracting outcome when one or more of the assumptions to the 
indifference proposition do not hold.  To take one example, when the threat of reputational 
sanctions impedes one party from walking away from the negotiations, the court can improve 
efficiency by finding a commitment by the other party in the preliminary agreement.”) 
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formality, and organizational purposes.  Reframing preliminary agreements as 
markers for the accumulation of deal momentum explains why, once parties 
sign a preliminary agreement, they are likely to complete a deal, and on terms 
close to those in the preliminary agreement’s terms.  This explanation cuts 
against the conventional wisdom that preliminary agreements are contracts 
that need to be enforced to promote efficient dealmaking.  Rather, 
preliminary agreements are devices that promote commitment even without 
enforcement.16 
This Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I uses interviews with deal 
lawyers to show how parties and lawyers use non-binding preliminary 
agreements in modern dealmaking.17  Preliminary agreements are almost 
never publicly disclosed, so original interviews with deal lawyers offer a rare 
glimpse into a common but little understood deal practice.  An important 
contribution of this Part is that it attempts to accurately pinpoint when, in a 
deal’s lifecycle, parties enter into enter preliminary agreements.  Existing 
explanations describe preliminary agreements as first steps to a potential deal.  
In practice, however, parties enter a preliminary agreement when the deal is 
already likely to move forward.  Part II introduces the concept of deal 
momentum.  Specifically, this Part draws an analogy to Lon Fuller’s 
distinction between the formal and substantive functions of consideration18 to 
                                                
 16. Contract law scholarship generally embraces the view that enforcement is an 
important tool to motivate parties to comply.  See Gilson et al., supra note 6, at 1379 (noting 
that “the expectation of formal enforcement creates incentives for parties to perform their 
obligations”); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 
113 YALE L.J. 541, 546 (2003) (noting that contracts may be (a) “self-enforcing,” as when 
“gains from breach are lower than the expected profit stream from future contracts that 
breach would cause to vanish;” (b) enforced informally through reputational sanctions; or (c) 
enforced formally.  “When contracts fall outside of the self-enforcing range, however, legal 
enforcement is necessary to ensure performance . . . when a party’s failure to perform could 
threaten its contract partner’s survival; and when contractual surplus would be maximized if 
one or both parties make relation-specific investments.”); Robert E. Scott, The Law and 
Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 279, 280 (2006) (“In particular, 
parties wish to make credible (i.e., enforceable) promises to motivate their contracting 
partners to invest in jointly profitable activities.”). 
 17. The twelve interviewees include nine senior law-firm partners, counsels, and 
senior associates with significant private M&A practices, and two senior in-house attorneys 
with significant M&A experience.  Interviewees practiced at law firms or companies in New 
York, Silicon Valley, Chicago, and Houston.  For a full list and description of interviews, see 
infra App. A. 
 18. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 799 (1941) 
(distinguishing between the formal and substantive reasons that courts and parties attach 
consideration to contracts).  
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show that non-binding preliminary agreements inject valuable form and 
formality into an otherwise nebulous negotiation process.  Part III considers 
the implications of these observations for contract theory, contract 
enforcement, and deal design.  Specifically, it suggests that courts need not 
always enforce preliminary agreements. 
The principles developed in this Article can be applied broadly.  Within 
corporate law, this Article helps to sharpen the theoretical boundaries of the 
deal.  More broadly, it helps to explain why parties use non-binding 
agreements in a variety of contexts, and sheds light on another realm where 
private ordering flourishes even when formal enforcement is available. 
I. NON-BINDING AGREEMENTS IN MODERN DEALMAKING 
Why and how do parties use non-binding preliminary agreements?  This 
Part draws on previously unstudied sources—qualitative evidence from 
interviews with practicing deal lawyers—to shed new light on the positive 
question of how parties use preliminary agreements. 
Section A explores existing explanations for why parties use preliminary 
agreements.  Section B presents the findings from original interviews with 
deal lawyers, a survey of recent practitioners’ literature, and a survey of recent 
preliminary agreement cases.  It shows that most preliminary agreements in 
M&A deals are signed, but non-binding.  Oddly, however, once parties sign a 
non-binding preliminary agreement, their deal is very likely to be 
consummated, and on terms similar to the ones that the parties agreed to in 
the initial preliminary agreement.  This Article calls the combination of these 
two attributes “deal stickiness.”  Most interestingly, preliminary agreements 
are sticky even though there is little consequence for walking away.  This final 
observation is particularly odd, and appears to cut squarely against the idea 
that that consequences, such as enforcement, have an effect on behavior.  
Later Parts discuss how non-binding preliminary agreements can shape 
behavior and add value, even in the absence of enforcement. 
A. Dealmaking in Theory 
There are two leading theories on why parties use preliminary 
agreements: to resolve deal uncertainty, or to resolve deal complexity.  Both 
of these theories suggest that preliminary agreements make deals more 
efficient, and that, as with other contracts, enforcing them helps motivate 
parties to use these efficient tools.  This Section outlines those leading 
theories after a short primer on the timing of deals. 
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1. The Timing of Deals 
Parties enter M&A deals in stages.19  The stages are punctuated by two 
major events: “signing” and “closing,” which refer to the signing and 
execution, respectively, of a definitive acquisition agreement.20 
In private M&A deals,21 parties also often enter into a preliminary 
agreement before signing the acquisition agreement.  The preliminary 
agreement “describes the basic terms of the proposed transaction.”22  It may 
include, for example, price, a description of what is being sold (such as assets 
or stock), and a description of deal structure (such as whether the assets will 
be purchased debt-free, whether the buyer will need to secure financing, and 
whether the deal is a merger or acquisition).  The preliminary agreement also 
“usually states that the document is nonbinding.”23  In particular, the 
agreement makes clear that the business terms, such as price, are nonbinding.  
Provisions governing the negotiation process, however, are often binding.24  
For instance, the parties may agree that they are bound to exchange 
information confidentially or to negotiate exclusively with each other for a 
period of time.25 
Signing the definitive acquisition agreement creates true contractual 
liability.26  Parties are, at that point, legally obligated to perform the 
                                                
 19. Choi & Triantis, supra note 13, at 1 (“Commerical agreements are often entered 
into in stages.”). 
 20. Jonathan M. Barnett, Hollywood Deals: Soft Contracts for Hard Markets, 64 DUKE 
L.J. 605, 618 (2015) (describing the timeline of a “conventional” deal, such as an M&A deal). 
 21. Public M&A deals are those that involve at least one public company party that 
is obligated by securities laws to disclose the terms of any material agreements to 
shareholders. Parties to public M&A deals are substantially less likely to use preliminary 
agreements, because they fear that entering into a preliminary agreement may trigger 
disclosure obligations.  In contrast, private M&A deals do not trigger disclosure obligations.  
See George Georgiev, Too Big to Disclose: Firm Size and Materiality Blindspots in Securities 
Regulation, 64 UCLA L. REV. 602, 605 & n.2 (2017) for a discussion of public company 
disclosure obligations.  
 22. Barnett, supra note 20, at 618 (“First, after some initial discussion, the parties 
enter into a preliminary agreement, often called a ‘memorandum of understanding’ or ‘letter 
of intent,’ which describes the basic terms of the proposed transaction and usually states that 
the document is nonbinding.”).  
 23. Id. 
 24. LAKE & DRAETTA, supra note 6.  
 25. Id.   
 26. See id. (describing the package of documents that parties sign at signing).  
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transaction.27  There is often a gap in time of several weeks or months 
between signing and closing, to allow parties to complete a number of 
“closing conditions,” such as obtaining regulatory approval or financing, 
reorganizing their corporate structures to maximize the deal’s tax benefits, or 
completing due diligence of the target company.28  After parties meet the 
closing conditions, they “close” the deal by, for instance, exchanging 
consideration for stock or assets.29 
It is worth highlighting two common misunderstandings about 
preliminary agreements.  First, scholars generally do not distinguish between 
binding and non-binding preliminary agreements—instead, they seem to 
assume that parties intend for preliminary agreement to be binding. This may 
be because scholars tend not to distinguish between different types of 
commercial deals—and having a binding preliminary agreement is more 
common in other contexts, such as in commercial lending and venture capital.  
In M&A practice, preliminary agreements tend be the opposite of what is 
studied: The vast majority of preliminary agreements are specifically non-
binding with respect to business terms. 
Second, scholars routinely misplace when in the deal’s lifecycle parties 
enter preliminary agreements.  Scholars assume that preliminary agreements 
are first steps,30 which parties enter before investigation, and before making 
relationship-specific investments.  In reality, parties usually sign preliminary 
agreements slightly later in the deal process, after most initial investigation is 
done.  This subtle distinction in the deal timeline is of central importance for 
practical and theoretical reasons.  Practically, the fact that parties sign 
preliminary agreements later in the process suggests that parties are fairly 
serious about the deal when they sign a preliminary agreement, which may 
inform whether courts should hold parties liable for breach.  Theoretically, a 
                                                
 27. Lou R. Kling et al., Summary of Acquisition Agreements, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 779, 
781 (1997). 
 28. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset 
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 260 (1984) (“[M]ajor portions of a typical acquisition agreement 
result from the fact that many acquisition transactions contemplate a significant gap between 
the date on which the acquisition agreement is signed and the date on which the transaction 
is closed.”); Kling et al., supra note 27, at 781 (identifying the need to secure financing as a 
reason for a delay between signing and closing). 
 29. See Kling et al., supra note 27, at 781 (describing the closing as the moment 
“when the acquisition actually occurs”). 
 30. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6, at 663 (“After the parties agree on what 
they can, and before uncertainty is resolved, one or both of them make a sunk-cost investment. 
This pattern of commercial behavior suggests that the parties have made a ‘preliminary 
agreement’ . . . .”). 
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clear understanding of timing may help to define the boundaries of deals.  
Previous work noted that a deal’s theoretical boundaries extend beyond the 
definitive acquisition agreement, and should encompass other 
contemporaneous ancillary agreements.31  Mapping the nuanced contours of 
the early deal timeline helps contract and corporate law scholars understand 
whether a deal begins with preliminary agreements.32 
2. Preliminary Agreements and Deal Uncertainty 
In a series of influential papers about preliminary agreements, Alan 
Schwartz and Bob Scott argue that parties use preliminary agreements to 
resolve deal uncertainty, and that enforcing breaches of these agreements 
motivates parties to use then efficiently. 
At the core of Schwartz and Scott’s argument is the observation that in 
complex deals, parties may not be able to resolve enough uncertainty before 
entering into a full, detailed, and definitive acquisition agreement.  In order to 
resolve uncertainty and determine whether the deal is feasible and 
worthwhile, parties need to make relationship-specific investments that 
cannot be recouped if the deal does not materialize.33  Relationship-specific 
                                                
31 [[EDS: cite to Hwang, Unbundled]] 
 32. In The Nature of the Firm, Ronald Coase argued that firms grow larger that is, 
firm boundaries grow—if it is cheaper to produce a particular component internally.  Firm 
boundaries do not grow if it is cheaper to purchase that component from outside the 
organization.  R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 393–97 (1937).  This 
theory has been used to explain why some firms are highly integrated (and large), and others 
are more specialized (and rely on outside suppliers to produce most components).  It is 
possible to think about complex contracting in an analogous way.  Contract drafters can 
choose to write all of a deal’s terms into one single contract, or to parcel out the terms into 
separate contracts.  In previous work, I argued that the boundaries of the deal extend beyond 
the central, definitive acquisition agreement.  See Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains, 164 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1403, 1410 (2016).  Even though a deal can span several agreements and contracts, 
the theoretical boundary of the deal extends beyond the physical acquisition agreement, and 
encompasses contemporaneously entered ancillary agreements.  Id.  This Article argues that 
the boundaries of the deal can also be extended temporally—that is, the deal can begin earlier 
in time than the central acquisition agreement.  See infra Part III.  For a more modern 
discussion of Coase’s theory, see also Peter G. Klein, The Make-or-Buy Decision: Lessons 
from Empirical Studies, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 435 (Claude 
Ménard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2008) (surveying the empirical literature on firms’ vertical 
integration, and providing a summary of Coase’s theory of the firm).  
 33. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6, at 663 ("The parties do not agree and, 
indeed, may never have attempted to agree on important terms such as the price.  After the 
parties agree upon what they can, and before uncertainty is resolved, one or both of them make 
a sunk-cost investment”).  
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investments also create space for parties to behave opportunistically.  For 
example, Party A might walk away from a deal after Party B has sunk 
significant costs into relationship-specific due diligence.  Preliminary 
agreements, backed with a bit of enforcement bite in the form of reliance 
damages, are an efficient way to motivate parties to make relationship-specific 
investments to resolve uncertainty, and also to deter opportunism.34 
In M&A deals, parties, in some ways, use preliminary agreements in just 
the way Schwartz and Scott described.  Suppose that the buyer and seller can 
agree that the buyer will acquire all of the seller’s business for $50–70 per 
share of stock.  The parties enter into a preliminary agreement that notes the 
price range.  The buyer then conducts due diligence on the seller to 
understand better the seller’s business’s financial health, which will allow the 
buyer to propose a specific price within the agreed-upon range.  The buyer’s 
due diligence on the seller is a relationship-specific investment—it is specific 
to the deal at hand, and information gained in that process cannot usually be 
used in another deal if the current one falls through. 
Schwartz and Scott argue that, in order to motivate the buyer to 
undertake relationship-specific investements like the expensive due diligence 
process, the parties must face the threat of enforcement for breaching the 
preliminary agreement.35  Without the threat of enforcement, the seller might 
walk away from the deal at any time, even when the buyer has already made 
significant investments.  When a seller behaves opportunistically, of course, 
future buyers will be more hesitant to make relationship-specific investments, 
which would mean that many efficient deals simply would not take place.  
Enforcement also protects the seller.  The threat of enforcement against the 
buyer deters the buyer from walking away, which is important if the seller 
begins the process by granting a period of exclusive access to the buyer. 
3. Preliminary Agreements and Deal Complexity 
An alternative theory for preliminary agreements, advanced by Albert 
Choi and George Triantis, suggests that deal parties use preliminary 
agreements because the sheer complexity of a deal might make it impossible 
to complete in one stage.  Preliminary agreements can thus help parties deal 
                                                
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 667 (“A reliance recovery will encourage parties to make preliminary 
agreements and will deter some strategic behavior.”). 
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with the cognitive load of negotiating many issues at once,36 or allow parties 
to buy some time to engage experts to weigh in on the most complex parts of 
deals.37  For example, parties may agree to basic business terms during the 
preliminary agreement stage, and, in later stages, to engage lawyers, 
accountants, and others to work through the details.38  Preliminary 
agreements, then, are a way to modularize complex deals—to break complex 
transactions into smaller pieces, for the purpose of making them easier to 
handle.39  
Choi and Triantis suggest that although some deals are too complex to 
complete in one step, they are nonetheless worth doing.  Using preliminary 
agreements tools allows parties to complete deals they would otherwise not 
be able to do if they were constrained to one-step deals.  Like Schwartz and 
Scott, Choi and Triantis also argue that courts ought to enforce preliminary 
agreements—at least a little bit—because preliminary agreements are only 
useful if parties feel motivated to adhere to them.  In particular, they note that 
“the court can . . . restrict the bargaining flexibility through the imposition of 
the duty to negotiate in good faith, especially on the party with the superior 
bargaining position.”40  In other words, enforcing a preliminary agreement 
means that parties can rely on their preliminary bargains as they engage in the 
costly process of solving deal complexity.  Like Schwartz and Scott, Choi and 
Triantis argue that attaching some enforcement to preliminary agreements 
encourages efficient dealmaking, and deters opportunism. 
4. Enforcement as a Motivator 
Both existing explanations for why parties use preliminary agreements 
rely on formal enforcement as an important part of the story.  This is not a 
                                                
 36. Choi & Triantis, supra note 13, at 2 (“As Howard Raiffa framed it, there is a 
tradeoff between maximizing the gains from trade by allowing log-rolling across a large 
number of issues, and the cognitive load of dealing with all at the same time.”).  
 37. Id. (In many cases, the deferred issues are turned over to experts, such as 
architects, engineers, accountants, and, in particular, lawyers.  While the motivation may be 
either the cognitive load or the need for experts, we call this second category as being multi-
stage contracting motivated by complexity.”).  
 38. Id.  
 39. Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. 
L. REV. 1175, 1176 (2006) (describing modular contracting as a way to break down complex 
systems into smaller, easier-to-understand chunks).  See also Hwang, supra note 7, at 1418 
(describing the practice of breaking out complex, regulatory-heavy parts of a deal into a 
module so that experts can weigh in on those parts). 
 40. Choi & Triantis, supra note 13, at 20.  
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surprise.  Much of law is based on the assumption that enforcement can 
motivate behavior.  Enforcing a criminal law, for instance, is thought to deter 
citizens from committing crimes.41  Similarly, damages in products liability 
cases is meant to deter unlawful behavior.42  In contract law, the same 
conventional wisdom holds: consequences for breaching a contract is meant 
to deter parties from breach, and motivate parties to adhere to contract terms. 
In the business law context, the idea of enforcement as motivation for 
compliance is also closely related to the idea that business contracts (and 
contracts in other contexts) have two distinct stages.  In the first stage, the ex 
ante contract design stage, parties negotiate and agree to terms.43  In the 
second stage, the ex post enforcement stage, parties who breach contracts 
have to pay to litigate the case, and many ultimately pay damages.44 
Sophisticated parties make a thoughtful trade-off between incurring costs 
in the design phase or incurring costs in the enforcement phase.45  If parties 
invest more time and money in the design stage, their contracts presumably 
become more precise and more clear, less likely to be litigated, and easier to 
resolve when litigated.46  As a result, the enforcement phase is less costly.  
                                                
 41. Bidish Sarma, Deterrence and Prosecutorial Accountability, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. __,  at __ (forthcoming, 2017) (describing deterrence as “a justification for punishment 
premised on the theory that the threat of punishment can deter individuals from breaking the 
law”).  [[EDS: Please check to see if this is now published/available]] 
 42. See, e.g., Dmitry Karshtedt, Casual Responsibility and Patent Infringement, 70 VAND. 
L. REV. 565, 620–21 (describing the role of enforcement in deterring unlawful behavior in 
both products liability and patent infringement). 
 43. Cf. Choi & Triantis, supra note 5, at 852 (“[D]rawing on the line of scholarship 
that analyzes the rules-standards dichotomy in the design of legal rules, recent work frames 
the choice between vague and precise contract terms as a tradeoff in information costs: 
precise contract provisions raise contracting costs on the front end, but reduce enforcement 
costs at the back end.”); Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 
TEX L. REV. 1581, 1583–84 (2005) (defining the cost of a contract as the ex ante negotiating 
and drafting costs, plus the probability of litigation multiplied by the sum of the parties’ 
litigation costs, the judiciary’s litigation costs, and judicial error costs). 
 44. Choi & Triantis, supra note 5, at 852. 
 45. See id. (noting that contract provisions are sometimes intentionally vague 
because “[i]f a provision matters only in remote contingencies, . . . then the back-end costs 
should be discounted by that remote probability, and it may be correspondingly efficient to 
save front-end costs by using a standard (or a vague term) rather than a rule.”); see also Posner, 
supra note 43, at 1587; Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 5, at 817; Steven 
Shavell, On the Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 289, 298 (2005). 
 46. See Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 5, at 835 (“When contracts 
scholarship is concerned with front-end (transaction) costs, such as the cost of negotiating 
and writing contracts, vague terms reduce these costs by letting the enforcing court complete 
the contract.”). 
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However, parties may also choose to spend less time drafting an agreement in 
the design phase—which results in a vague, boilerplate, or not-as-thoughtfully 
constructed agreement—on the belief that an enforcement action is unlikely.47  
Other scholars have described situations where expending relatively little time 
in design is rational.  For example, material adverse change clauses in 
acquisition agreements are vague, but so rarely enforced that parties often 
choose not to expend too much effort making them specific in the design 
phase.48  On the other hand, too little investment in design can also backfire 
in the enforcement phase.  In the recent Martin Marietta49 case, for example, 
M&A deal parties entered into a fairly standard confidentiality agreement 
without much negotiation.50  In the subsequent enforcement phase, the 
agreement cost the buyer the opportunity to close a $5.5 billion hostile 
takeover (which was enjoined), and cost both parties significant legal fees.51  
Regardless of whether parties choose to allocate their resources to design to 
enforcement, however, they are trying to minimize overall costs associated 
with the contract, which is the sum of the ex ante stage and the enforcement 
phase.52 
When formal enforcement is unavailable or not preferred, parties can 
substitute with informal enforcement.  For instance, some tight-knit 
communities, such as those of whalers, diamond merchants, and cotton 
merchants, have opted out of formal judicial enforcement for contract 
breaches.53  Instead, when a breach occurs, parties turn to trade-association 
sanctions or reputational damage. 
                                                
 47. Choi & Triantis, supra note 5, at 852. 
 48. Id. at 852–53. 
 49. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 
2012).  
 50. See id. at 1210–11.  See Sasha S. Hahn, Note, “Between” a Rock and a Hard Place: 
Martin Marietta v. Vulcan and the Rise of the Backdoor Standstill, 65 HASTINGS L.J 1393 (2014), 
for a detailed analysis of the Martin Marietta case. 
 51. Hahn, supra note 50, at 1409. 
 52. See Posner, supra note 43, at 1583–84. 
 53. See George Baker et al., Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 117 Q.J. 
ECON. 39 (2002); Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 3; Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra 
note 3 (describing how sales contracts for domestic cotton are not consummated under the 
Uniform Commercial Code or enforced in courts—rather, they are drafted under private 
contract default rules and disputes are arbitrated in merchant tribunals); Ellickson, A 
Hypothesis, supra note 3 (describing the norms that high-sea whalers use to resolve disputes 
over the ownership of harvested whales); Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle, supra note 3 
(describing the extra-legal, norms-based dispute resolution between cattle ranchers in rural 
Shasta County, California). 
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As with formal enforcement, informal enforcement relies on the threat 
of punishment for breach to curb parties’ behavior.  Without enforcement, 
either formal or informal, there seems to be little incentive for parties to play 
by the rules.  Scholarship on preliminary agreements aligns with contract 
theory in general in suggesting that enforcement plays an important role in 
motivating parties to play by the agreed-upon rules. 
B. Dealmaking in Practice 
The conventional wisdom that parties rely on preliminary agreements to 
resolve complexity and uncertainty, and that the threat of enforcing those 
agreements through reliance damages is what makes parties abide by their 
terms, is incomplete.54 
This Section presents an alternative view.  Previous work in this area has 
focused on surveys of enforcement outcomes.  This Article relies, instead, on 
original interviews with practicing deal lawyers and previously unexamined 
practitioners’ literature from the front lines of deal design.  It also 
supplements these with a traditional survey of court cases in common 
business jurisdictions.55 
                                                
 54. Contracts create a binding obligation to perform.  Those who breach a contract 
obligation are usually obligated to pay expectation damages.  See Lon L. Fuller & William R. 
Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 61(1937) ("Since the 
expectation interest furnishes a more easily administered measure of recovery than the 
reliance interest, it will in practice offer a more effective sanction against contract breach.”).  
It is worth underscoring the fact that an award of expectation damages is a significant 
sanction.  Expectation damages are designed to put a non-breaching party in the same 
position it would have been if the deal had been completed.  See Gilson et al., supra note 6, at 
1424 n.158 (“Expectation damages purport to put the injured party in the position she would 
have been in had the collaborative exploration not only been successfully concluded, but a 
joint project also agreed upon and realized.”).  In their seminal work on reliance damages, 
Lon Fuller and William Perdue identify a spectrum of possible damages, ranging from no 
damages to expectation damages.  Reliance damages represent one point along that spectrum: 
reliance damages are designed to compensate a non-breaching party who has suffered a harm 
as a result of relying on the breaching party.  See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 54, at 54 
(describing reliance as a remedy when “the plaintiff has in reliance on the promise of the 
defendant changed his position.  For example, the buyer under a contract for the sale of land 
has incurred expense in the investigation of the seller’s title, or has neglected the opportunity 
to enter other contracts.  We may award damages to the plaintiff for the purpose of undoing 
the harm which his reliance on the defendant’s promise has caused him.  Our object is to put 
him in as good a position as he was in before the promise was made.  The interest protected 
in this case may be called the reliance interest.”). 
55.  For more on methodology, see supra App. A.  
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This Section begins by showing that preliminary agreements are sticky—
that is, they appear to have strong influence on parties’ behavior. Then, it 
shows that stickiness persists despite weak enforcement for breach.  Stickiness 
in the absence of enforcement presents is a rather odd result.  If this is true, 
this might suggest that enforcement, either formal or informal, has a much 
smaller role in motivating behavior than previously thought.  This puzzle sets 
the stage for Part II, infra, which introduces the concept of deal momentum 
to explain why unenforced, non-binding preliminary agreements have such a 
hold on parties’ behavior. 
1. Stickiness 
Once signed, preliminary agreements appear to have exceptional 
practical binding power, in two ways.  First, once parties sign an agreement, 
they tend to follow up by entering into a definitive acquisition agreement.  
Deals with preliminary agreements also are likely to close.  Second, parties 
tend not to stray too far from the business terms agreed to in the preliminary 
agreement, even though those terms are specifically deemed non-binding.56  
This Article describes these two characteristics, together, as preliminary 
agreements’ “stickiness.” 
Stickiness in preliminary agreements is surprising.  First, since scholars 
describe preliminary agreements as tools that parties use specifically when 
they do not have enough information to sign a definitive contract, it is odd 
that preliminary agreements so often lead to parties signing a definitive 
contract.  In theory, in the process of resolving uncertainty through due 
diligence, parties should sometimes discover information that scuttles a deal 
by revealing that the deal is not economically worthwhile, or that the other 
party is not an ideal partner.  The fact that preliminary agreements almost 
always lead to the signing of definitive documentation suggests that parties 
rarely find information in due diligence that changes their decisions about 
whether to do a deal.  This, too, would be a surprise.  It would suggest that 
due diligence is expensive and time-consuming, but largely useless—and yet, 
                                                
 56. See supra note 16.  Dealmakers with a wide breadth of experience—at firms and 
in-house, working with repeat players and one-off deal parties, in private and public deals, in 
a variety of firms and cities, representing financial parties and strategic parties—report that 
preliminary agreements have exceptional binding power.  The twelve interviewees include 
nine senior law-firm partners, counsels, and senior associates with significant private M&A 
practices, and three senior in-house attorneys with significant M&A experience.  Interviewees 
practiced at law firms or companies in New York, Silicon Valley, Chicago, and Houston.  For 
a full list and description of interviews, see infra App. A. 
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it is a common practice in which sophisticated parties continue to engage.  In 
other words, if parties use preliminary agreements when deals are uncertain, it 
seems odd that uncertain deals tend to lead to definitive contracts and deal 
completion. 
Second, it is a surprise that parties tend to hew closely to the business 
terms initially agreed to in the non-binding preliminary agreement.  Parties are 
generally required to negotiate in good faith toward a definitive deal.  That 
duty to negotiate in good faith does not require parties to adhere to the 
specific business terms outlined in a preliminary agreement, but parties 
nevertheless appear to feel bound by those terms.  If parties do need to 
renegotiate business terms, they tend not to do so without at least offering a 
reason for the deviation. 
Stickiness is particularly puzzling in light of the lengths to which parties 
go to ensure that, as a legal matter, preliminary agreements are neither binding 
nor enforceable.  For example, parties routinely include the words “non-
binding” on every agreement page and add provisions that allow parties to 
walk away from the agreement without consequences.57  To avoid even the 
inference that a preliminary agreement is binding, some deal lawyers advise 
their clients not to sign the agreements.58  Nonetheless, the agreements’ 
business terms stay sticky. 
2. Weak Enforcement 
While preliminary agreements tend to be sticky, liability for breaching a 
preliminary agreement appears to be limited and weak.  A comprehensive 
survey of preliminary agreement litigation between business parties reveals 
that very few preliminary agreement cases were litigated to opinion in those 
jurisdictions.59 
One important exception is the SIGA case, which wound its way 
through the Delaware Chancery and Supreme Courts twice in a decade-long 
                                                
 57. See Barnett, supra note 20, at 618 (noting that a letter of intent or term sheet in a 
conventional deal “describes the basic terms of the proposed transaction and usually states 
that the document is nonbinding.”); Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, in Palo 
Alto, Cal. (May 23, 2016) (“Pretty much on every page we have something that says that this 
is a non-binding agreement—this is non-binding except exclusivity/no shop, confidentiality, 
governing law, fee sharing.”). 
 58. Telephone Interview with NY Firm Attorney II, in Palo Alto, Cal. (May 17, 
2016) (“Typically, we advise people not to sign term sheets”).  
59.  See Appendix A, infra. 
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litigation over a letter of intent.60  Each time the courts concluded a 
significant chapter of the SIGA litigation, law firms issued client alerts and 
memoranda61 that dissected the meaning of the decision for preliminary 
agreement-making in M&A deals.  A thorough survey of this practitioner 
literature shows that lawyers were surprised by the Delaware courts’ decisions 
to enforce a preliminary agreement that had been marked “non-binding.”62  
Preliminary agreements are rarely litigated—and parties are almost never 
found liable for expectation damages—so when they are found liable for 
expected damages, practitioners find the result unusual.  
Interviews with deal lawyers also revealed their belief that enforcement 
for preliminary agreement breach is rare.  This is despite the fact that deal 
lawyers, in general, showed a sophisticated understanding of the enforcement 
options available to them.  Most of the deal lawyers interviewed understood 
that preliminary agreements obligated parties to negotiate in good faith 
toward a definitive agreement, and that breaching that duty could result in an 
award of reliance damages.63  Despite clearly understanding that enforcement 
                                                
 60. See SIGA Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., 132 A.3d 1108 (Del. 2015); SIGA 
Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., 67 A.3d 330 (Del. 2013). 
61.  This Article calls client alerts and memoranda “practitioner literature.” 
 62. The SIGA case was litigated to an opinion four times: the Delaware Chancery 
Court issued opinions twice, and the parties appealed those decisions to the Delaware 
Supreme Court twice.  Each time the Delaware courts issued an opinion, law firms that 
advised clients in M&A deals issued a flurry of client alerts and memoranda, the issuance of 
which indicated that the SIGA decision was out of the ordinary and worth highlighting.  With 
regard to SIGA I, see, e.g., Robert Burwell & Howard Miller, When a Non-Binding Term Sheet 
Becomes Binding, MINTZ LEVIN COHN FERRIS GLOVSKY & POPEO PC: CORPORATE & 
SECURITIES (July 8, 2013), https://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2013/Advisories/3203-0713-
NAT-COR/index.html [https://perma.cc/H8M5-LFUB] (noting that the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s decision in SIGA I may require breaching parties to pay expectation damages to non-
breaching parties in preliminary agreement cases, and “propos[ing] ways to mitigate the risk 
that a court might award expectation damages based on a ‘non-binding’ term sheet or letter 
of intent”); Morrison & Foerster LLP, Delaware Supreme Court: Bad-Faith Attempt to Renegotiate 
Term Sheet May Create Liability for ‘Benefit-of-the-Bargain’ Damages, CLIENT ALERT (June 10, 2013), 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/delaware-supreme-court-bad-faith-attemp-60366 
[https://perma.cc/DNA4-C8ZQ] (noting that in SIGA I, the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
“message to negotiators is clear: Don’t agree to a term sheet unless it is explicitly non-binding 
or you are prepared to continue negotiations in good faith, consistent with the term sheet.”).  
With regard to SIGA II, see, e.g., Richter, supra note 2, see also supra note 2 and accompanying 
text. 
 63. Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, supra note 57 (“We are aware 
of weird DE cases that talk about duty to negotiate in good faith.”); Telephone Interview 
with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney II, in San Francisco, Cal. (June 2, 2016) (“I know there’s 
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was available, however, deal lawyers nonetheless presented a very different 
account of how enforcement plays out in practice. 
First, deal lawyers describe actively trying to avoid enforceability in their 
clients’ preliminary agreements.  Most lawyers said that they regularly drafted 
provisions stating that parties could walk away from a preliminary agreement 
at any time, for any reason.64  Some lawyers took this further, and described 
provisions in which the parties agreed that they have no obligation to 
negotiate in good faith.65  Lawyers also described taking exceptional care to 
ensure that their preliminary agreements are “non-binding” and “non-
enforceable.”  To do so, they might include document footers stating that an 
agreement is “non-binding,” advise their clients not to sign the agreements 
(so that the agreements do not look like contracts), and include additional 
provisions specifying that some provisions are enforceable (usually 
confidentiality, exclusivity, and one or two others) and others are not (the 
business terms).66  For example, one lawyer said that letters of intent are, “as a 
general proposition, non-binding,” and another described them as 
presumptively non-binding but with some binding provisions, like those 
governing exclusivity or confidentiality.67  One lawyer noted that “pretty 
                                                
case law out there saying that [parties] have been sued for walking away [from a preliminary 
agreement].”) 
 64. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney I, in Palo Alto, Cal. 
(May 31, 2016) (“Usually, you’ll have an express statement that’s the opposite [of a duty to 
negotiate in good faith] in the letter of intent—that parties can walk away for any reason at 
all. [You] contract away that obligation.”); Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, 
supra note 57 (noting that his company uses a letter with language that “represents that we 
will negotiate in good faith the terms of the letter.  However, notwithstanding, we can 
terminate this letter for any and all reasons any time.”); Telephone Interview with In-House 
Attorney II, in Palo Alto, Cal. (May 25, 2016) (“[O]ccasionally, I have put in that the parties 
do agree to negotiate in good faith.  So there are times when it’s talked about, and we say 
each have a right to walk away”). 
 65. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney I, supra note 64. 
 66. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney II, supra note 63 
(“Some clients take the approach that they do want to have some binding provisions in the 
term sheet”—confidentiality or exclusivity.  “It’s not uncommon to see some binding 
provisions in the term sheet.  People are pretty clear about what’s binding and not binding.”); 
Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney III, in Palo Alto, Cal. (Jun. 15, 2016) 
(noting that although “[f]rom a legal standpoint, I like to keep the binding and non-binding 
documents separate,” he has “moved to using non-binding term sheets along with binding 
exclusivity”); Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney III, in Palo Alto, Cal. (Jun. 20, 
2016) (noting that term sheets are “normally signed, because the term sheets are non-binding, 
but some things are binding, such as confidentiality provisions, governing law”).  
 67. Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney I, in Palo Alto, Cal. (May 7, 
2016) (“LOIs are, as a general proposition, non-binding.”);  Telephone Interview with In-
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much on every page, we have something that says that this is a non-binding 
agreement,” while another noted that he went through “great pains to put in 
the agreement in ten different ways” that it was non-binding.68  One lawyer 
described entering into a binding term sheet only once, and also mentioned 
that in drafting that particular term sheet, he could find almost no precedent 
for a binding term sheet within his law firm.69  
Second, deal lawyers also expressed that even if preliminary agreements 
could be enforced as a legal matter, they are so rarely enforced that 
enforcement is not considered a real possibility.  Lawyers expressed several 
reasons for this view.  First, they believe that the duty to negotiate in good 
faith is an extremely easy duty to meet, and that proving a breach of that duty 
in a litigation would be extremely challenging.70  One lawyer, for instance, 
noted that “sometimes people do disavow what’s in the term sheet because of 
a change in circumstances . . . .  I wouldn’t necessarily consider that bad 
faith.”71  When asked about the duty to negotiate in good faith, the same 
lawyer replied, “[the duty] may be binding, but good luck proving failure to 
negotiate in good faith.”72  Another lawyer notes that he has “seen plenty of 
deals where buyers walk—they find something better, the numbers don’t play 
out, they haven’t had much faith the management team.  Deals fall apart all 
the time before an agreement.  But as far as bad faith, I’ve not been involved 
in any situation where the seller thinks the buyer is trying to steal [confidential 
information].”73 
Third, when asked about their experience with preliminary agreement 
enforcement, only two of the twelve lawyers interviewed had even heard of a 
threatened litigation over a preliminary agreement.74  One Silicon Valley 
                                                
House Attorney II, supra note 64 (“I tend to say that the presumption [is that] this is a non-
binding letter of intent, except for sections.  Confidentiality and sometimes exclusivity.”). 
 68. Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, supra note 57 (“Pretty much on 
every page we have something that says that this is a non-binding agreement.”);  Telephone 
Interview with In-House Attorney II, supra note 64.  
 69. Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney IV, in Palo Alto, Cal. (May 26, 
2016). This lawyer’s firm employs several hundred deal lawyers and is a leading deal firm. 
 70. Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney I, supra note 67 (“It may be 
binding, but good luck proving failure to negotiate in good faith.”).  
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney V, in Palo Alto, Cal. 
(Jun. 20, 2016).  
 74. Only N.Y. Firm Attorney II and Silicon Valley Firm Attorney V had heard of a 
threat of litigation.  See Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney II, supra note 58, and 
Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney V, supra note 73.  
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lawyer noted that she has never been in a situation where there have been 
ramifications for walking away from a term sheet.75  None had worked 
personally with a client on a preliminary agreement that was later litigated, 
none had threatened to enforce preliminary agreements against others, and 
none had been on the receiving end of such a threat. 
The lack of appetite for formal enforcement makes economic sense.  
Commercial litigation between sophisticated parties is exceptionally 
expensive.76  Even though parties make relationship-specific investments 
during the preliminary agreement phase, the cost of commercial litigation—
even just the beginning phases of litigation—may easily eclipse the amount 
that parties lose by walking away from the preliminary agreement.  Moreover, 
litigation distracts management and may prevent the company from pursuing 
other promising transactions.  One lawyer described the loss of having a party 
walk away from a preliminary agreement as a “sunk cost”: 
Generally, there’s nothing you can do [if the parties walk away from a 
preliminary agreement].  [The preliminary agreement] will usually say this 
expressly that either party will walk away for any reason or no reason.  
Unless you can show fraud or some other behavior that is otherwise 
actionable on a standalone basis, you view it as a sunk cost in your 
business.77 
The decision to avoid litigation is particularly reasonable because the 
expected recovery of winning a preliminary agreement contest is low: In most 
cases, at best, the winning party can hope to recover reliance damages.  The 
cost of litigation is high, and the expected recovery of litigation is very low. 
Not only is formal enforcement weak, but informal enforcement is also 
weak. In settings where informal enforcement is effective, “performance is 
encouraged and breach penalized by the cancellation of expected future 
dealings with the counterparty, by the loss of reputation (with the resulting 
reduction in future business with other potential counterparties in the relevant 
economic and social communities), or by an individual disposition toward 
reciprocity (and thus a willingness to reward cooperation and punish 
defection).”78  In other words, as in formal enforcement settings, those who 
do not play by the rules are punished.  They earn a reputation for operating 
outside of the norm, and their future dealings are suspect.  Even when parties 
                                                
 75. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney II, supra note 63.  
 76. Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney I, supra note 67 (noting that it is 
“not typical to sue someone else to enforce an obligation to negotiate in good faith” and that 
that would be “fact-intensive, expensive litigation”). 
 77. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney I, supra note 64.  
 78. Gilson et al., supra note 6, at 1379. 
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do not expect to encounter the same party again in a business setting, they 
may be deterred from bad behavior if they do not want to suffer reputational 
consequences within their community that may later translate to a loss.79 
The community of M&A parties, however, is not like the tight-knit 
communities of diamond merchants or rural cattle ranchers, where informal 
enforcement works well.  For one thing, the community of M&A parties is 
not tight-knit.  While certain subsets of M&A parties are repeat players—for 
example, serial acquirers or private equity firms—many M&A parties rarely 
enter the market.  As a result, their reputations, good or bad, are less well-
formed (and are less important, as they will not be using them in a future 
transaction). 
Moreover, when interviewed, deal lawyers report, at most, mixed 
reputational consequences for parties who back out of preliminary 
agreements.  One Silicon Valley lawyer, for instance, noted that companies 
that serially breach preliminary agreements do gain a bad reputation.  “In the 
tech world, [if] some serial buyer approaches the sellers, . . . one phone call 
and [the sellers] know the buyer and kind of know what to expect.  If one 
buyer has a bad reputation, like a reputation for reneging the purchase price at 
the eleventh hour before signing the [definitive acquisition] agreement, that 
will be taken into account.”80 
Most other lawyers, however, noted that parties with reputations for 
backing out of preliminary agreements are only minimally punished on the 
market, if at all.  For instance, a New York lawyer began by noting that “if 
there was someone who routinely didn’t get deals done, that would become 
market knowledge, and be taken into account when thinking about whether 
the deal will go through.”81  He immediately qualified the statement, however, 
by noting the deals are very fact-specific, and that “the color of [the serial 
breacher’s] money is the same as everyone else’s.”82  Another Silicon Valley 
lawyer made a similar statement: “There are buyers that have a reputation for 
being willing to renegotiate some of the terms.  But it’s often based on stuff 
                                                
 79. Id. at 1392–93 (“Even where the particular parties do not expect to deal with 
each other in the future, the tit-for-tat informal enforcement structure will still work if a 
misbehaving party expects to trade with others in the future—i.e., if trade will be multilateral 
rather than bilateral—so long as that party’s reputation—i.e., the collective experience of 
others who have previously dealt with that person—becomes known to future counterparties.  
The actions of future counterparties then serve to discipline the misbehaving party.”). 
 80. Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, supra note 57.  
 81. Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney III, in Palo Alto, Cal. (May 17, 
2016). 
 82. Id.  
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that they find in due diligence.  Everyone knows going into the term sheet 
[that] it’s all subject to the buyer’s due diligence.”83  In other words, even 
when a party breaches a preliminary agreement, it is often thought to be the 
result of legitimate, good-faith changes in facts and circumstances, rather than 
the breaching party’s bad faith.  The same Silicon Valley lawyer also noted 
that bad reputation has only a small effect on future deals: “It’s certainly 
possible in circumstances where a company is selling itself and there are 
multiple different people are interested in it, that if they get two bidders who 
were very close in price, there may be . . . [an] inclination to go for the other 
one [the bidder who does not have a reputation for breach].”  She notes, 
however, that management must still look out for investors’ interests, and 
investors are interested in getting as high a price as possible. 
In light of weak formal and informal enforcement for breach, then, what 
accounts for deal stickiness? Part II attempts to explain this phenomenon. 
II.  DEAL MOMENTUM 
This Part presents a theory of deal momentum to explain why M&A 
parties adhere to non-binding preliminary agreements despite the fact that 
there is little consequence for breach.  In short, by the time parties enter a 
preliminary agreement, they have already resolved enough uncertainty that 
momentum pushes the deal forward, even in the absence of a preliminary an 
agreement.  Thus, preliminary agreements are better understood as signposts 
for the accrual of deal momentum, rather than as contract-like devices. 
Part II.A shows how accurately pinpointing deal timing is important to 
understanding how parties use non-binding preliminary agreements.  Instead 
of using them as first steps to a deal, as scholars previously thought, parties 
use preliminary agreements only after they have completed initial due 
diligence.  Based on a more accurate understanding of deal timing, Part II.B 
offers an alternative explanation for why parties use preliminary agreements.  
Specifically, it posits that these agreements have both formal and substantive 
functions.  While the literature has focused exclusively on substantive 
functions—preliminary agreements’ resemblance to contracts, and the need 
to enforce them as such—preliminary agreements are largely valuable because 
they formalize an otherwise unstructured dealmaking phase.  In other words, 
preliminary agreements are not very useful as contracts, but quite useful in 
that they can help parties signal, organize, attach moral suasion, and build 
trust. 
                                                
 83. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney III, supra note 66.  
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A. Not-So-Preliminary Agreements 
Perhaps the first place where the literature on preliminary agreements 
deviates from modern practice is in its description of when parties enter into a 
preliminary agreement.  For the most part, the literature describes the 
preliminary agreement as the first step in dealmaking.  It seems to envision, 
for instance, that two CEOs meet for coffee, decide that they wish to do a 
deal, and write down some broad terms (such as price ranges) that might suit 
them both.  After forming this extremely basic plan for doing a deal—which 
is what the literature considers a preliminary agreement—the parties then 
separate to resolve uncertainty about the deal through due diligence.  After 
some time, the CEOs then reconvene to hash out the details of their deal.84 
In practice, however, the deal timeline looks a little bit different. The 
literature is accurate in that a large quantity of due diligence occurs between 
the signing of the preliminary agreement and of the definitive agreement.85 
M&A due diligence is as an expensive and labor-intensive undertaking: It “is 
not simply first-year lawyers looking through boxes of documents.  The 
process also includes experts in various areas . . . . [and] covers any issue that 
a buyer or an investor would possibly care about.”86  
What the literature overlooks, however, is the important distinction 
between the quantity of due diligence and the materiality of due diligence.  
Indeed, in the time between the preliminary agreement and definitive 
documentation, parties engage in a high quantity of due diligence process—
both the literature and deal lawyers agree on that point.  That quantity, 
however, does not represent the process’s importance in determining the 
deal’s business terms.  For instance, many lawyers note that, despite the 
quantity of the diligence done between the preliminary and definitive 
agreements, the information discovered in that diligence only “sometimes” 
                                                
 84. Choi & Triantis, supra note 13, at 1 (“Commercial agreements are often entered 
into in stages.”) see Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6, at 662–63 (describing the initial process of 
dealmaking).   
 85. Douglas Godfrey & Charles Fox, Transactional Skills Training: All About Due 
Diligence, 11 Tenn. J. Bus. L. 357 (2009) at 359 (describing the due diligence process as “not 
just first-year associates looking through boxes of documents. The process also includes 
experts in various areas looking at any subject that the buyer, in the case of an acquisition, is 
interested in . . . . Thus, the due diligence process as a whole covers any issue that a buyer or 
an investor would possibly care about”); Telephone Interview with SV Firm Attorney II, 
supra note 63 (“Most term sheets are finalized before the real due diligence begins”).  
 86. Id. at 359. 
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causes the parties to renegotiate business terms.87  This suggests that this 
phase of due diligence is only sometimes material. 
While the bulk of due diligence is performed between signing the two 
agreements, most of the material diligence is complete before the parties sign 
the preliminary agreement.  Consider a company that is auctioning itself.  In 
preparation for accepting bids, that company will make much of its relevant 
financial information available in a physical or virtual data room so that 
potential bidders can begin to conduct due diligence.88  That early due 
diligence is the most important—it is the information on which the potential 
buyer determines the most important business terms.89  In fact, one 
publication by non-lawyer deal advisors describes the due diligence process as 
largely being completed in the pre-preliminary agreement phase.  That 
publication describes post-preliminary agreement diligence as “final diligence” 
that “generally serves to confirm the consistency and material accuracy of 
representations made by the target company.”90  While the buyer will 
“often . . . uncover information that will warrant [it] to revise its valuation,”91 
the message is clear: From the perspective of bankers and businesspeople, 
who set the deal price and negotiate the preliminary agreement’s material 
business terms, the bulk of diligence is done before the preliminary 
agreement.  The voluminous diligence that lawyers do between the 
preliminary and definitive agreements is high in quantity and important, but it 
is also confirmatory, rather than material, in nature. 
Distinguishing the quantity of due diligence from the materiality of due 
diligence suggests modifying the conventional understanding of when parties 
                                                
 87. Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney III, supra note 66 (“Some of the 
legal stuff gets renegotiated based on diligence.”); Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley 
Firm Attorney II, supra note 63 (“There are buyers that have a reputation for being willing to 
renegotiate some of the terms.  But it’s often based on stuff that they find in due diligence.”). 
 88. Michael D. Benson & Jeffrey S. Shippy, The M&A Buy Side Process: An Overview 
for Acquiring Companies, Stout Risius Ross, at 3–6 (Aug. 2013), 
https://www.stoutadvisory.com/insights/article/ma-buy-side-process-overview-acquiring-
companies [https://perma.cc/83MF-2FX9] (download PDF), at 5 (“Shortly after the 
management presentation is concluded, the target will typically provide the acquirer with 
access to an online information ‘datasite’ where select legal, financial, operational and other 
information on the business can be found so that the acquirer can determine an appropriate 
valuation to submit a [letter of intent].”). 
 89. Id. (“The [letter of intent] highlights the acquirer’s intention to acquire the 
target and sets forth the proposed purchase price along with all relevant key terms, in much 
greater detail than did the [indication of interest].”). 
 90. Id. at 5–6. 
 91.  Id. at 6. 
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enter into a preliminary agreement.  The conventional understanding is that 
parties enter into preliminary agreements at the very beginning of the deal.  In 
practice, however, parties enter into preliminary agreements after finishing 
most material due diligence.  Thus, preliminary agreements are not very 
preliminary, since they are entered into when enough material has been 
examined to determine, with some certainty, important business terms like 
price.92 
Another way to think about bulk and materiality of diligence is to 
reframe the deal timeline from the perspective of bankers and businesspeople.  
As Choi and Triantis note, the time period between the preliminary 
agreement’s signing and the definitive agreement’s signing is characterized by 
the addition of experts—such as lawyers—to resolve the deal’s uncertainty.93  
This suggests that lawyers often become heavily engaged in the deal only after 
the parties have signed the preliminary agreement.  From a deal lawyer’s 
perspective, then, the real work of the deal begins after the preliminary 
agreement.  From the perspective of bankers and businesspeople, however, 
the deal is finalized in broad strokes at the preliminary agreement stage.  This 
explains why preliminary agreement terms remain largely unchanged after the 
agreement’s signing: —they are business terms that are negotiated by bankers 
and businesspeople, who have already completed the bulk of their relevant 
diligence prior to the agreement’s signing. 
                                                
 92. Of course, this separation demands an answer to another question: If the 
material diligence is done, what is the bulky diligence that is being done after the preliminary 
agreement is signed? Much of the post-preliminary agreement diligence involves reviewing 
contracts for “change of control” or “assignment” provisions, that is, determining which 
supplier contract, for instance, will be automatically terminated when control of the target 
company changes over from the seller to the buyer.  In examining those kinds of contracts, 
material information can be found that changes price terms.  For instance, the buyer might 
discover that, while the target has been profitable for many years, it will soon become less 
profitable because particular lower price terms will take effect.  See id. at 6 (describing “full 
due diligence,” in which the buyer examines the target’s “financial statements, operating 
reports and other private and confidential company documents (both financial and non-
financial in nature)”). 
 93. Choi & Triantis, supra note 13, at 2 (noting that even when uncertainty does not 
stand in the way of a deal, “complexity of the deal may be a reason for agreeing to a subset of 
issues initially and turning to the remaining issues later.  In many cases, the deferred issues are 
turned over to experts, such as architects, engineers, accountants, and, in particular, 
lawyers.”).  
  
 
65:2 Hwang
 
  
 
29 
B. Preliminary Agreements as Signposts for Deal Momentum 
Pinpointing when parties enter preliminary agreements presents an 
interesting puzzle: If preliminary agreements are not meant to be early 
contractual tools that help parties resolve uncertainty,94 then why do they 
exist?  And if deal terms are close to being finalized by the time parties sign 
the preliminary agreement, why do parties divert from the process of 
negotiating the definitive agreement and expend time and resources to draft a 
non-binding, unenforced preliminary agreement? 
This Section offers a new explanation for why and how parties use 
preliminary agreements.  It begins by distinguishing between an agreement’s 
formal and substantive functions, in much the same way other scholars have 
distinguished between the form and substance of consideration.  Then, it 
suggests that preliminary agreements are not primarily powerful because of 
their resemblance to contracts, but because they help make an otherwise 
unstructured phase of the negotiation process more formal.  They are thus 
better understood as signposts for when sufficient deal momentum has 
accrued, rather than as contracts.  In other words, there comes a time in a 
deal’s lifecycle when the parties have resolved enough uncertainty that they 
are likely to do the deal.  The preliminary agreement marks that moment—
when, whether or not parties sign a preliminary agreement, a deal is likely to 
go forward. 
1. Form and Substance in Preliminary Agreements 
In his seminal article Consideration and Form, Lon Fuller argued that there 
are both formal and substantive reasons to attach consideration to contracts.  
Fuller notes that enforcing  “gratuitous promises”—that is, promises without 
                                                
 94. Schwartz and Scott, for instance, note that a preliminary agreement is entered 
into when “[t]he parties do not agree and, indeed, may never have attempted to agree on 
important terms such as the price.  After the parties agree upon what they can, and before 
uncertainty is resolved, one or both of them make a sunk-cost investment.”  See Schwartz & 
Scott, supra note 6, at 663.  Similarly, Choi and Triantis describe preliminary agreements as 
early-stage contracts. They deviate slightly from Schwartz and Scott in the reasons that parties 
enter into preliminary agreements—they note that some deals proceed in multiple stages 
because “the complexity of the joint undertaking and the difficulty in negotiations” 
necessitate a certain time lag to allow parties to turn some issues “over to experts, such as 
architects, engineers, accountants, and, in particular, lawyers.”  In other words, preliminary 
agreements are described as putting in place some initial rules to which the parties agree.  
Then, within the boundaries of those rules, parties resolve uncertainty and agree to final 
terms.  See Choi & Triantis, supra note 13, at 2.  
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consideration—“is not an object of sufficient importance . . . to justify the 
expenditure of the time and energy necessary to accomplish it.”95  This, Fuller 
notes, is a substantive objection, because it relates to the significance of the 
promise made: Promises without consideration are not substantively 
important.  In contrast, most arguments about the need for consideration 
relate to the importance of form.  Fuller identifies three broad categories that 
characterize the functions performed by legal formalities: the evidentiary 
function (creating evidence of a contract), the cautionary function (forcing 
parties to consider the contract more carefully), and the channeling function 
(signaling to the outside world that the contract is enforceable).96 
Preliminary agreements, too, have both formal and substantive functions.  
So far, other scholars have focused on the substantive aspects of preliminary 
agreements.  In particular, the literature attributes a preliminary agreement’s 
usefulness to the threat of potential remedies for breach (i.e., the award of 
reliance damages).  Like in contracts, the threat of enforcement of a 
preliminary agreement is meant to incentivize adherence.  But there is 
significant evidence to suggest that the primary contribution of a preliminary 
agreement is not its substance, but its form, and the formality it lends to the 
negotiating process.  By going through the formalities of drafting and signing 
a preliminary agreement, parties can signal seriousness to each other and 
attach moral suasion to their non-binding agreement.  Through the form of a 
preliminary agreement, parties can organize their early collaboration, and 
introduce lawyers, who act as a set of reputational gatekeepers, to help them 
further solidify their certainty in the deal. 
2. Signaling 
In the early stages of deal negotiation, parties make very few promises to 
each other, formal or otherwise.97  They do, however, begin sinking costs into 
investigating each other as potential deal parties, and begin considering the 
value of the potential deal.98  At some point, material due diligence is largely 
complete, and parties are positioned to begin the expensive process of 
                                                
 95. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 799 (1941) 
(distinguishing between the formal and substantive reasons that courts and parties attach 
consideration to contracts). 
 96. Id. at 800–01 (describing the functions performed by legal formalities). 
 97. Parties may enter into a confidentiality agreement, in which they agree to keep 
the information they exchange confidential.  However, after the confidentiality agreement is 
signed, there are few other promises. 
 98. See Benson & Shippy, supra note 88, at 3–4 (describing the valuation process). 
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negotiating a detailed definitive agreement.  But before then, parties enter into 
a non-binding preliminary agreement. 
An important reason that parties incur the expense of entering into non-
binding, unenforced preliminary agreements is to signal to one’s deal 
counterparty that one is a good deal partner.  One of the most puzzling 
interview results is that the deal lawyers interviewed reported seemingly 
contradictory information about the consequences for a preliminary-
agreement breach.  On one hand, they almost uniformly reported that 
breaching a preliminary agreement had little or no effect on a non-repeat-
player deal party’s reputation.99  At the same time, deal lawyers also reported 
that parties, even (or especially) those that were not repeat players in the 
M&A market, cared about “their word,” or having a reputation as an 
“integrity player.”100  These observations seem almost diametrically opposed: 
Why do non-repeat players care about their reputations, especially if 
breaching a preliminary agreement has little effect on their reputations? 
One explanation is that even non-repeat players, who do not care about 
their reputation on the broader M&A market, care about their reputation 
within that particular transaction.  M&A dealmaking is a multi-stage process: 
After the preliminary agreement, there is more exchange of information, a 
more thorough round of deal negotiations, and potentially weeks or months 
of daily or near-daily interaction with one’s deal partner.101  In each stage, 
                                                
 99. Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney III, supra note 81 (remarking 
that “[i]f there was someone who routinely didn’t get deals done, that would become market 
knowledge, and be taken into account when thinking about whether the deal will go 
through,” but that everything was “so facts and circumstances” and that ultimately “the color 
of their money is the same as everyone else’s”).  But that is not the case in certain tight-knit 
subsets of the M&A community.  Silicon Valley Firm Attorney V, for instance, noted that 
reputations may matter in venture capital deals.  Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley 
Firm Attorney V, supra note 73. 
 100. Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney I, supra note 67 (“There is 
certainly moral suasion to [a preliminary agreement].  I think that most people—there are 
exceptions—in the business world, even if they aren’t repeat players in the market, most 
players want to be seen as integrity players.”); Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, 
supra note 57 (“One of the lawyers I worked with in Virginia always he thought about the 
term sheet as a gentleman’s agreement.  He would say, ‘You gave me your word, and now 
you’re trying to walk away from your word?’”); Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm 
Attorney IV, supra note 69 (noting that “[parties] felt morally obligated not to ask for a bigger 
escrow because they’d asked for a smaller one [in the term sheet].  They can suffer though 
this problem or they cannot go back on their word.  The business people want to not go back 
on their word.”).   
 101. Benson & Shippy, supra note 88(describing the multiple rounds of interaction, 
due diligence, and negotiation that are involved in the dealmaking process). 
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there is an opportunity for increasingly granular negotiation and interaction.  
And, if the deal is actually completed, many of those who interacted during 
the M&A process may continue to work together indefinitely within the 
merged company.  It is not uncommon, for instance, for the target company’s 
key employees to be deeply involved in the dealmaking process.  After the 
deal is done, these same key employees often continue to work for the buyer 
for a period of time, or indefinitely.  Thus, individual people may become 
repeat players within the context of one particular deal, because they must 
interact numerous times with the other side during the dealmaking process.  
When an M&A deal is framed as a multi-step process, it becomes clear why 
lawyers describe deal parties as caring about their reputations.  A preliminary 
agreement is one of the deal parties’ first opportunities to interact with each 
other, and to prove that they are trustworthy deal parties.  Adhering by deal 
terms, especially non-binding terms, helps to build one’s reputation within the 
context of that deal and to smooth the transaction process going forward. 
Preliminary agreements may also serve a different signaling function.  
Because parties sign them when there is enough deal momentum for a deal to 
go forward, signing a preliminary agreement might also be a way to signal that 
they have reached that tipping point.  One lawyer, for instance, drew an 
analogy between preliminary agreements and giving gifts when dating: “You 
go on dates, . . . but that doesn’t mean you’re getting married.  But you give 
gifts sometimes.  It means some level of commitment.”102  In other words, 
preliminary agreements may be a “gift” to signal that one is interested enough 
and serious enough to undertake the expense of negotiating and signing a 
preliminary agreement. 
Thus, even though parties can legally walk away from a preliminary 
agreement or deviate from its terms, adhering to the terms may serve 
important signaling functions to one’s deal partner. This means that, 
independent of its substantive uses, entering into a preliminary agreement 
may be an attractive step to take. 
3. Organization 
The formal process of entering into a preliminary agreement also serves 
organizational purposes.  One deal lawyer, for instance, described having a 
central document to focus on as the primary reason for having a preliminary 
agreement: 
                                                
 102. Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney II, supra note 58.   
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It helps me and the deal team focus on whether there’s a deal to be had.  
Too many times the business people come and they think they have a 
great idea.  Like, I’m going to put my chocolate in your peanut butter.  
You have to sit back and be like, that’s great, but who’s going to pay for 
the packaging?  The marketing?  How about employees? [A term sheet] 
helps both sides knock out the material terms and figure out if there’s a 
skeleton to get the deal done.103 
Other deal lawyers described a similar purpose for using preliminary 
agreements: to “mak[e] sure there’s a meeting of the minds on fundamental 
deal provisions,”104 to “make sure the parties are in the same ballpark,”105 and 
“even though it’s non-binding, it helps to solidify whether there’s a meeting 
of the minds on the material agreements.”106 
Similarly, preliminary agreements can be a tool for getting the attention 
of upper management by creating a central document on which the board of 
directors can vote.  Lawyers also note that having a tangible document, even 
if unsigned or specifically marked non-binding, helps management feel 
“comfortable that this is a real offer” and that there is a basic agreement that 
justifies “getting the bankers spinned up and the attorneys spinned up and 
getting the internal people and the accounting [and] finance people 
involved.”107  In other words, even though the preliminary agreement is non-
binding, preliminary agreements can be a useful tool around which upper 
management can have discussions and focus their efforts. 
In addition to aiding internal organization, parties might use a 
preliminary agreement to organize external affairs.  For instance, lawyers 
report using preliminary agreements to begin the antitrust review process, or 
to solidify financing for a leveraged deal.108 
4. Attaching Moral Suasion 
Deal parties and deal lawyers also use preliminary agreements to impose 
a sense of moral obligation or moral suasion on the other party in a 
                                                
 103. Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney II, supra note 64.  
 104. Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney III, supra note 81.  
 105. Id. 
 106. Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney I, supra note 67.  
 107. Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, supra note 57.  
 108. Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney III, supra note 81 (“Often times 
the existence of a [letter of intent] or [memorandum of understanding] that is not binding will 
be simply done for execution purposes.  For example, you can make a Hart-Scott filing on a 
[letter of intent].”).   
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preliminary bargain. Moral suasion is the process through which actors are 
encouraged to act a certain way not because of material incentives, but 
because of normative, or moral, appeals.  Regulators, for example, sometimes 
appeal to private actors’ sense of morality or altruism in order to ensure 
compliance, rather than ensure the same through formal sanctions.  Moral 
suasion can also compel parties to take on activities that are not economically 
in their best interest. 
Many lawyers report that even non-repeat players care about hard-to-
quantify factors such as morality and integrity.  One deal lawyer notes that 
“even if [M&A parties] aren’t repeat players in the market, most players want 
to be seen as integrity players.  At the time they enter into the [preliminary 
agreement], they have a good faith intention to do the deal.”109  Multiple deal 
lawyers reported that preliminary agreements created some kind of integrity 
bond.  They noted, for example, that a deal party might not ask for a change 
in a term sheet’s business terms because “they cannot go back on their word” 
and because an M&A deal party’s business people, who negotiated the 
preliminary agreement’s terms, “want not to go back on their word.”110  
Another lawyer described having a senior colleague explain to him that a term 
sheet is a “gentleman’s agreement” and if someone backed out, the senior 
colleague “would say, ‘you gave me your word, and now you’re trying to back 
away from your word?’”111  Repeatedly, lawyers called preliminary agreements 
“gentlemen’s agreements” or “handshake agreements”112—terminology which 
belies a belief that these agreements create moral suasion even though they 
are non-binding.113  Since the amount of legal obligation that parties take on 
when they enter a preliminary agreement is very small, this moral suasion may 
actually play a greater role in motivating parties to adhere to the bargain than 
the role played by legal obligation. 
In preliminary agreements between M&A parties, moral suasion is 
particularly important for two reasons.  First, deal parties do not think of their 
                                                
 109. Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney I, supra note 67.  
 110. Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney IV, supra note 69.  
 111. Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, supra note 57.  
 112. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney I, supra note 64 
(“There’s a moral obligation to live up to the handshake agreement.  Most people try to live 
up to that.  And honestly there has to be some trust.  If there’s not trust between the parties, 
no deal gets done. They shake hands at that price and they both behave that they will a 
certain way.”); Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, supra note 57 (describing non-
binding preliminary agreements as “gentlemen’s agreements”).  
 113. Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney I, supra note 67 (“There is 
certainly moral suasion to [a preliminary agreement].”).   
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agreements as formally enforceable, as a legal matter.  Moral suasion allows 
parties to add seriousness and heft to agreements that otherwise have none.  
Second, moral suasion in this context motivates party behavior in a way that 
informal enforcement usually cannot.  Most informal enforcement works by 
depriving a bad actor of future interactions.  For example, if Anna breaches 
an agreement with Brian, Brian’s informal-enforcement recourse is to refuse 
to interact with Anna in the future, or to damage Anna’s reputation so that 
others will not interact with her in the future.  M&A deal parties, however, are 
often not repeat players, so they are, in a way, judgment-proof from informal 
sanctions.  Attaching moral suasion, a non-forward-looking riff on informal 
sanctions, allows M&A deal parties to motivate their counterparties to behave 
well, even when none of the parties are repeat players.  Although deal lawyers 
never said as much, they seemed to imply that feeling guilty about not being 
an integrity player motivated parties to behave well, even if parties felt no 
threat of a future economic or reputational loss.  
5. Verification 
Although deal lawyers generally report that serial preliminary-agreement 
breachers suffer from few, if any, reputational consequences, the same may 
not be true of deal advisors.  Where deal parties themselves are immune to 
informal enforcement, the reputation of related repeat players, such as the 
investment bankers and lawyers that advise on the deal, may play a role. 
Deal advisors can be thought of as gatekeepers—independent entities 
that serve as an outside monitor, “who screen[ ] out flaws or defects or who 
verifies compliance with standards or procedures.”114  The role of gatekeepers 
in curbing bad behavior is well developed in the corporate governance 
literature.  Gatekeepers have two different roles: They can be in a position “to 
prevent wrongdoing by withholding necessary cooperation or consent,” or 
they can be “reputational intermediar[ies] to assure investors as to the quality 
of the ‘signal’ sent by” another entity.  In the literature, auditors are “the 
paradigmatic examples of ‘gatekeepers’—that is, independent professionals 
who are interposed between investors and managers in order to play a 
watchdog role that reduces the agency costs of corporate governance.”115 
                                                
 114. John C. Coffee Jr., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 2 (2006). 
 115. John C. Coffee Jr., The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries, 
Auditor Independence and the Governance of Accounting 2 (Columbia Law Sch. The Ctr. 
for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 191, 2001).  
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In M&A deals, deal advisors can play the role of reputational 
intermediaries.  For example, a handful of elite law firms advise most M&A 
deal parties, and even when their clients are not repeat players, the law firms 
are.116  Thus, even when deal parties are not concerned with reputational 
losses from breaching preliminary agreements, their lawyers will be 
concerned, and may advise their clients to think carefully both during the 
entry of the preliminary agreement and before walking away. 
*  *  *  * 
In short, the power of preliminary agreements comes not from the fact 
that they allow parties to attach formal sanctions, as contracts do.  They do 
not set up frameworks in which parties can resolve deal uncertainty, because 
most material uncertainty is resolved before parties sign a preliminary 
agreement.  Rather, preliminary agreements are useful because they are central 
documents that parties can use as a reference, or to organize their affairs, 
either internally or externally.  They mark a moment in time when parties 
have resolved enough uncertainty that a deal is likely to occur, whether or not 
they actually set forth their dealmaking intent on paper in a preliminary 
agreement.  In other words, preliminary agreements are not necessary to get a 
deal done.  They are a step that parties take when a deal is all but inevitable. 
One easy way to see the lack of necessity for preliminary agreements is to 
examine when preliminary agreements are most prevalent.  Specifically, 
preliminary agreements are very common in private M&A deals—deals in 
which parties do not need to disclose the deal to securities regulators—and 
quite uncommon in public deals.117  The broad strokes of the deal contracting 
process remain the same, whether the deal is private or public.  Parties 
perform due diligence, sign a contract, and then close the deal.118  In public 
deals, however, preliminary agreements are rare because parties do not wish 
to trigger the need to make a securities filing.  Nonetheless, public deals are 
                                                
 116. Elisabeth de Fontenay, Law Firm Selection and the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 
41 J. CORP. L. 393, 396 (2015) (arguing that law firms add value because certain elite law firms 
“repeatedly engage in the same type of high-stakes transactions [and] acquire private 
information about the range of plausible deal terms and their current market prices that other 
players cannot replicate”). 
 117. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney II, supra note 63. 
 118. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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completed, which suggests that preliminary agreements are not a necessary 
step in dealmaking.119 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT AND DEAL DESIGN 
This Part discusses implications for deal design and contract 
enforcement.  It also builds on previous work,120 which began the process of 
trying to understand the theoretical and contractual boundaries of the deal.  
Section A argues that enforcing preliminary agreements may not be necessary, 
and may in fact deter efficient use of preliminary agreements.  This 
contravenes the conventional wisdom that some enforcement is necessary to 
induce efficient use. Section B discusses the implications of how changing 
enforcement of preliminary agreements can and should change how deal 
parties use preliminary agreements.  In particular, deal parties can more freely 
embrace preliminary agreements as organizational tools, rather than as 
contracts. 
Finally, Section C explores how preliminary agreements fit into a 
discussion of the boundaries of a complex bargain.  A previous article 
introduced the idea that the boundaries of a deal might exceed the four 
corners of an acquisition agreement, and, in fact, exist also in the many 
ancillary agreements that parties sign.121  This Section argues that perhaps the 
boundaries of a deal can also be stretched temporally, to the preliminary 
agreement phase.  Just because the theoretical boundaries of a deal extend 
temporally, however, does not mean that enforcement must map on to the 
deal boundaries.  In fact, enforcement to the edges of a deal’s boundaries may 
crowd out efficient private ordering. 
A. Enforcement 
By understanding how preliminary agreements work in practice, courts 
may be better equipped to interpret and enforce agreements and contracts 
                                                
 119. One might argue that in public deals, there is enough readily-available 
information about the target that parties do not need a preliminary agreement in order to 
create a framework for more thorough diligence of the target.  This argument, however, does 
not account for the fact that even in deals where public companies acquire private ones in 
deals of sufficient size to trigger securities filings for the public acquirer, the parties try not to 
use preliminary agreements. In these types of public-private deals, there is not sufficient 
information about the private target to resolve uncertainty about the target.  Nonetheless, the 
parties do not need to enter a preliminary agreement in order to do a deal. 
 120. Hwang, supra note 7. 
 121. Id. 
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between sophisticated parties.  In the case of preliminary agreements, 
sophisticated parties appear to use preliminary agreements in way such that 
they need not always be formally enforced. In fact, there are instances where 
formal enforcement may disincentivize parties from making efficient deals. 
A central tenet of contract theory is that negative enforcement outcomes 
(or the threat of them) affect parties’ behavior.  Moreover, more severely 
negative enforcement outcomes should be more effective at curbing bad bad 
behavior.  But those observations often miss an important point: that the 
probability of the negative outcome also plays a role in affecting parties’ 
behavior. 
Consider this scenario: Jane and Anne are parties to a contract.  They 
agree that, if Anne breaches the contract, Jane will take all of Anne’s personal 
belongings and set them alight on the sidewalk.  The enforcement outcome is 
very negative—a breach might result in the loss of all of Anne’s personal 
belongings in a public, traumatizing, and humiliating way.  However, Anne 
may know that if she breaches, there is only a one percent chance that Jane 
will actually burn her belongings. Even if she breaches, she can rest assured 
that Jane is very unlikely to enforce.  
Thus, when Anne is considering whether to breach a contract, the cost 
of breach is not that she loses her belongings.  Rather, the cost of breach is 
the probability of enforcement—in this scenario, one percent—multiplied by 
the negative utility of the enforcement.  In other words, Anne considers the 
expected value of breach, rather than assuming that Jane will certainly 
enforce.  In this scenario, then, the expected cost of breach is close to zero.  
Thus, even though the enforcement outcome is very negative, Anne can 
breach often and with impunity, safe in the knowledge that her belongings 
will most likely be spared from a fiery end.  
When the probability of enforcement is close to zero, even very negative 
enforcement outcomes do little to motivate parties to adhere to contract 
terms—and that also appears to be true in the case of preliminary agreements.  
This observation is not entirely new, although it is has received limited 
attention in the literature.  What analysis exists is situated in research about 
the use of rules and standards in particular contract provisions.  For example, 
Choi and Triantis made a similar observation in an earlier article on the 
strategic vagueness of material adverse change clauses in acquisition 
agreements.  In their article, they note that to parties, the cost of a contract 
provision is the sum of its ex ante negotiating and drafting costs, and its ex 
post enforcement costs.  There is a trade-off between the two: more 
investment on ex ante drafting makes a provision clearer, which reduces ex 
post enforcement costs by eliminating some litigations and abbreviating 
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others.  Choi and Triantis note that material adverse change clauses have a 
very low probability of enforcement.  That low probability might explain why 
those clauses are vague: Parties rationally choose not to invest the high cost 
of ex ante negotiation and drafting, on the theory that the expected ex post 
cost of enforcement is low. 
In the context of preliminary agreements, breaching parties can expect 
the cost of breach to be particularly low.  For one thing, preliminary 
agreements are rarely enforced, which means the probability of enforcement 
is close to zero.  Even when enforced, moreover, the breaching party pays 
only reliance damages, which is a very low cost.  In other words, parties to a 
preliminary agreement can breach with impunity, with the understanding that 
the expected cost of that breach is close to zero.  This means, of course, that 
ex post enforcement of preliminary agreements already does very little to 
deter bad behavior from parties.  But, as this Article shows, preliminary 
agreements have many useful features—and even the threat of enforcement 
may deter parties from using preliminary agreements’ useful, non-contract 
features.  
For example, the threat of enforcement may deter parties from using 
preliminary agreements as an organizational tool.  Consider, for example, a 
scenario in which preliminary agreement breaches are enforced like contract 
breaches: breaching parties are responsible for expectation damages.  In this 
scenario, parties may be deterred from using preliminary agreements for fear 
that writing down even vague, preliminary, conditional intent to make a deal 
might result in expectation damages for breach.  To a lesser extent, attaching 
the possibility of reliance damages to a breach may already have a similar 
deterring effect.  In fact, parties already behave differently because of the 
consequences of writing down a preliminary agreement.  Public company 
deals, for example, almost never involve a preliminary agreement, because 
parties fear that writing down the preliminary agreement will trigger onerous 
disclosure obligations. 
While a preliminary agreement is certainly not necessary to dealmaking, it 
may still be helpful, and the law ought to be formulated in a way that 
incentivizes the use of helpful tools. Deal lawyers describe preliminary 
agreements as useful organizational tools: They can be useful in forcing 
businesspeople to decide on deal terms and can be touchstones when parties 
stray from the intent of the original deal.  Dialing back the threat of formal 
enforcement may mean that parties feel more comfortable writing down their 
preliminary agreements, which is good, because it means that parties are able 
to be more organized in early dealmaking. 
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Moreover, making formal enforcement an available remedy, even if it is 
rarely used, is not costless to the public.  The cost of formal enforcement is 
borne by both private parties (who incur litigation costs) and the public 
(through the expenditure of judicial resources in adjudicating these 
disputes).122  Few preliminary agreements are litigated to opinion, but it is 
hard to say how many preliminary agreements litigations are commenced.  As 
soon as litigation commences, the public incurs costs.  Reviewing complaints, 
setting motion schedules, and adjudicating motions to dismiss tie up judicial 
resources that could be spent elsewhere.  Using judicial resources to 
adjudicate preliminary agreement disputes seems particularly wasteful, 
because parties, for the most part, appear to be able to sort through their 
differences without judicial intervention. 
Although it may make sense to dial back on preliminary agreement 
enforceability, this Article does not argue that we ought to do away entirely 
with enforcing contracts between parties.  Here, it is important to highlight a 
distinction between preliminary agreements (between sophisticated parties) 
and formal contracts (between the same). 
Preliminary agreements are not contracts—they are signposts and 
organizational tools.  When parties sign a preliminary agreement, they do not 
mean to create an obligation to perform.  Rather, they intend to organize their 
thoughts and actions.  However, the moment when parties can organize their 
thoughts on paper happens to coincide with the moment when parties have 
already done enough diligence on each other and on the potential deal that 
the deal is likely to go through.  The fact that these moments occur at the 
same time creates the illusion that preliminary agreements work like 
contracts—that parties agree on something, and then they perform because 
they are obligated to do it.  In reality, however, preliminary agreements are 
not meant to be contracts.  They create no legal obligation, and parties’ 
performance is not because of any legal obligation. 
In contrast, contracts create a binding and enforceable obligation under 
the law.  When parties sign a contract, they do mean to create an obligation to 
perform.  Their performance of a particular agreed-upon term after the fact is 
because they are obligated to perform.  The key, then, is parties’ intent: in 
preliminary agreements, parties do not intend to create an obligation, so they 
ought not be punished for failing to meet that non-obligation.  In contracts, 
parties do intend to create an obligation, so they ought to be liable when they 
fail to meet that obligation.  And, as discussed here, the punishment—
through formal enforcement and award of appropriate damages—is what 
                                                
 122. Posner, supra note 43. 
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motivates parties to perform the obligation they previously agreed to.  Thus, 
keeping enforcement intact—and making that enforcement powerful—when 
parties intend to create obligations is important to motivating parties to keep 
their promises. 
B. Deal Design
If preliminary agreements are not enforced as contracts, parties will be
more likely to use them in deals, which is a positive outcome.  Just because 
preliminary agreements do not increase dealmaking efficiency by solving for 
uncertainty does not mean that preliminary agreements do not increase 
efficiency in other ways.  In particular, a preliminary agreement can be a 
valuable organizational tool, for several reasons. 
A preliminary agreement can help to focus deal teams around a common 
deliverable.  One lawyer, for example, noted that he went through “great 
pains to put in the [preliminary] agreement in ten different ways” that it was 
not binding, but still liked to use a preliminary agreement because “it helps 
me and the deal team focus on whether there’s a deal to be had.”123  He noted 
that “too many times, the business people come and they think they have a 
great idea.  Like, I’m going to put my chocolate in your peanut butter.  You 
have sit back and be like, that’s great, but who’s going to pay for the 
packaging?  The marketing?  How about employees? [A preliminary 
agreement] helps both sides knock out the material terms and figure out if 
there’s a skeleton to get the deal done.”124  Preliminary agreements are so 
useful as organizational tools that one lawyer described using them even when 
they were not shared with the other side—in other words, even when they 
were unilateral and bore no resemblance to contracts.  That lawyer noted that 
a “[t]erm sheet might be prepared even just for internal use,” to be used for 
talking points, and that it “may form the basis for the discussion at an early 
stage.”125 
A preliminary agreement can also help to ensure that parties are in 
general agreement at the start of the deal, which helps parties establish 
whether there is enough agreement to move forward in the deal.  For 
instance, several lawyers loosely described a preliminary agreement as a way to 
ensure that there was a “meeting of the minds”126—although they also 
123. Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney II, supra note 64.
124. Id.
125. Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney III, supra note 81.
126. Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, supra note 57; Telephone
Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney I, supra note 67; Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm 
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seemed adamant that preliminary agreements were not contracts.  One lawyer 
noted that he used preliminary agreements because “[y]ou want some kind of 
meeting of the minds before you get the bankers spinned up and the 
attorneys spinned up and getting the internal people and the 
accounting/finance involved.”127  Another described preliminary agreements 
as a way to save money and save time by ensuring that there was a “meeting 
of the minds on fundamental deal provisions” before engaging advisors and 
beginning diligence.”128  He noted that a preliminary agreement was a way to 
“make sure the parties are in the same ballpark.”129  Still another lawyer noted 
that “[y]ou generally want to make sure there’s a meeting of mind on both 
sides before you crank out [diligence, advisors].”130 
Finally, a preliminary agreement can help to minimize the costs of 
renegotiation.  As parties move forward toward signing definitive 
documentation, they might legitimately forget previously agreed-to terms, or 
disingenuously “forget” deal terms in order have a chance to renegotiate 
them.  A preliminary agreement, which functions as written (and possibly 
signed) evidence of how the parties agreed to proceed, can help to stop some 
of those renegotiations before they become too costly.  One lawyer, for 
instance, noted that “If someone tries to renegotiate something in a term 
sheet, and if I’m not trying to renegotiate, then I’ll point to the term sheet.  
I’ll say ‘we entered into this term sheet for a reason.’”131 
Although preliminary agreements are valuable organizational tools, they 
are under-utilized in public deals.  At present, deal lawyers use preliminary 
agreements almost exclusively in private deals.  Deal lawyers shy away from 
using preliminary agreements in public deals, for fear that signing a 
preliminary agreement will trigger a public disclosure obligation.132  There are 
many reasons to avoid public disclosure of a preliminary agreement.  For one 
thing, filing a public disclosure requires additional cost.  For another, 
preliminary agreements are, by nature, preliminary and subject to change.  
Disclosing their terms before the parties have fully vetted each other through 
Attorney III, supra note 81; Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney V, supra 
note 73.  
127. Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, supra note 57.
128. Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney III, supra note 81.
129. Id.
130. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney V, supra note 73.
131. Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, supra note 57.
132. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney II, supra note 63 (noting
that public companies usually do not want to use letters of intent because they do not want to 
trigger disclosure obligations).  
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the diligence process can send incorrect signals to the public, and cause the 
market to react in ways that are unforeseen—and, in the parties’ eyes, 
inaccurate.  Perhaps most importantly, parties might fear that a change in the 
preliminary agreement after it has been publicly disclosed will be received 
poorly by the market.  For instance, after the parties sign a preliminary 
agreement, the buyer may cancel the deal because it is unable to secure 
financing, or because it has changed its business plan.  The public, however, 
might interpret the deal cancelation as evidence of a defect in the target 
company.  Fear of these misinterpretations causes parties in public deals to 
avoid, rationally, the risk associated with filing a preliminary agreement. 
But deals, whether public or private, face similar organizational 
challenges.  In fact, public deals may be harder to organize than private 
deals—for instance, disclosure and reporting requirements imposed upon 
public companies add another layer of complexity to deals.  Already, lawyers 
in both public and private deals use some of the same tools to address 
organizational complexity.  For example, deal lawyers use signing and closing 
checklists to keep track of the deal’s many tasks and documents.133  These 
detailed to-do lists outline each step of the deal, who is responsible, and the 
status of completion.134  Deal lawyers in both types of deals also use working 
group lists, which help parties organize and identify the many players involved 
in the transaction, including deal lawyers representing all parties, regulatory 
specialists, and in-house point people, among others.135 
Preliminary agreements can be another useful organizational tool in a 
deal lawyer’s toolkit.  Making a clearer distinction between preliminary 
agreements and contracts is a first step toward incentivizing deal parties to 
use preliminary agreements as organizational tools.  Parties in public deals shy 
away from signing preliminary agreements, for fear that signed agreements 
might be construed as contracts that need to be publicly disclosed.  Parties 
and courts can both take steps to mitigate those fears.  First, parties can 
choose, as they already sometimes do, to use preliminary agreements, but not 
to sign them.  Parties already use unsigned organizational tools, such as 
checklists, to serve similar collaborative purposes, and do not publicly 
disclose those tools’ contents.  Second, courts can embrace the view that 
preliminary agreements are not contracts, and should not be enforced as such.  
                                                
 133. Hwang, supra note 7, at 1413 (describing the M&A deal checklist, which keeps 
track of all deal documents and action items). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Matthew Jennejohn, The Private Order of Innovation Networks, 68 STAN. L. REV 
281, 319–20 (2016) (describing cross-firm collaborations).   
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A uniform interpretation of preliminary agreements as organizational tools 
rather than as contracts may help to build a norm of using them, and a norm 
against classifying them as contracts, for securities-law and other purposes. 
C. The Temporal Boundaries of the Deal
Previous work argued that, contrary to conventional assumptions, deal
boundaries are not defined by the definitive acquisition agreement.136  Rather, 
deals are struck through many contemporaneous agreements that interact to 
form a deal, and their theoretical boundaries must expand to include those. 
Previous work further argued that if deals consist of many contracts, contract 
disputes involving one contract should perhaps be considered with reference 
to related contracts within the same deal. 
Of note, however, is that previous work limited the boundaries of the 
deal only to contracts that are entered into at the same time as the acquisition 
agreement.  It specifically excluded non-contract agreements, and agreements 
and contracts entered into non-contemporaneously with the acquisition 
agreement.  In other words, it clearly defined contemporaneous contracts as 
within the boundaries of the deal, and noted that other contract-like tools 
were too difficult to categorize without further study. 
By investigating preliminary agreements, this Article tries to understand 
whether those non-contemporaneous, non-contract agreements can be 
considered within a deal’s boundaries.  More clearly defining which 
documents are within the deal’s boundaries can aid in contract interpretation.  
Judges, for instance, can look to other documents within the deal’s 
boundaries to help sharpen their understanding of the deal, or to help 
interpret vague provisions. 
Preliminary agreements are a particularly interesting part of the deal-
boundary puzzle.  On one hand, a preliminary agreement bears strong 
resemblance to the document at the very center of a deal: the acquisition 
agreement.  Unlike an ancillary agreement, which contains provisions that 
supplement an acquisition agreement’s provisions, the preliminary 
agreement’s provisions are, by and large, the same as the acquisition 
agreement’s provisions.  Because preliminary agreements bear such a close 
resemblance to acquisition agreements, preliminary agreements appear very 
much at the center of deals, and therefore firmly within the deal’s boundaries.  
Placing the preliminary agreement so firmly within the deal’s boundaries, 
however, has consequences that appear, plainly, to be against the intent of the 
136. Hwang, supra note 7, at 1449 .
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drafting parties.  For example, if preliminary agreements are at the center of 
deals, their terms might be useful in interpreting ambiguities in the acquisition 
agreement.  But parties clearly intend for preliminary agreements not to be 
binding, which means that parties intend to leave room for acquisition 
agreement terms to sometimes, by design, deviate from the preliminary 
agreement’s terms.  Thus, it seems unreasonable to use the preliminary 
agreement to interpret ambiguities in the acquisition agreement. 
While preliminary agreements do look very much like acquisition 
agreements in some ways, they also deviate quite substantially from the other 
documents that are clearly within the boundaries of the deal.  Employment 
contracts for key employees, for instance, are clearly within the boundaries of 
the deal, but preliminary agreements are not very much like employment 
agreements at all.  Employment agreements are often necessary to the deal 
and preliminary agreements are not.  Employment agreements also provide 
supplemental provisions to the acquisition agreement, which suggests that 
employment agreements and acquisition agreements ought to be read 
together to resolve ambiguity.  In contrast, preliminary agreements are not 
supplemental to the acquisition agreement.  Ambiguities cannot be resolved 
by reading the two agreements together, because differences between them 
are likely by design.  Perhaps the most important difference, however, is that 
employment agreements, and most other ancillary agreements that are clearly 
within the boundaries of the deal, are contracts.  Although preliminary 
agreements may resemble lesser contracts, this is not the best way to 
understand them.  
On balance, it appears that preliminary agreements ought not to be 
considered part of the bargain.  Perhaps one important principle that can be 
distilled from this Article’s investigation into preliminary agreements is that 
only deal contracts ought to be eligible to be considered part of the bargain.  
Preliminary agreements, which are prone to change, are not contracts, so they 
cannot be used to interpret other parts of the deal.   
One important note, however: although preliminary agreements are not 
signed at the same time as the acquisition agreement, it is not this timing 
mismatch that makes preliminary agreements not part of the bargain.  In fact, 
there are other contracts signed before the acquisition agreement that clearly 
are part of the bargain.  Confidentiality agreements, for example, are binding 
contracts, and they are often incorporated by reference into the acquisition 
agreement.  Their incorporation by reference indicates that parties intend for 
them to be part of the bargain even though parties enter into them well in 
advance of the acquisition agreement.  Exclusivity agreements—and even the 
binding exclusivity provisions of otherwise non-binding preliminary 
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agreements—fall into the same category.  They are far removed, temporally, 
from the acquisition agreement.  However, because they are contracts, and 
because parties show clear intent for them to be part of the bargain, they 
clearly are part of the bargain.  In contrast, non-contract documents, no 
matter their temporal proximity to the signing of the acquisition agreement, 
are not within the boundaries of the bargain. 
CONCLUSION 
Existing scholarship misunderstands the role of non-binding preliminary 
agreements in high-value, complex M&A deals.  This Article argues that non-
binding agreements should not be treated as contracts, but as signposts for 
the accumulation of deal momentum.  They enhance deal efficiency through 
their formal, rather than substantive, functions.  Understanding non-binding 
agreements has significant implications for enforcement, theory, and deal 
design.  But while this Article has focused on non-binding agreements in the 
context of M&A deals, the concept of deal momentum has broad applicability 
in the law, and may shed light on non-binding agreement use in areas from 
family law to international treaty-making. 
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APPENDIX A: A NOTE ON METHODS; INTERVIEWS 
Existing scholarship on preliminary agreements has also focused on the 
results of enforcement, that is, reported opinions from cases that are litigated 
to a decision.  But these enforcement surveys are necessarily incomplete, 
because most commercial litigation settles out of court,137 unaccompanied by 
reasoned judicial opinions that shed light on the circumstances of these deals. 
This Article brings previously un-surveyed qualitative data to the debate 
in order to close this gap in the literature.  In this Article, I rely on three types 
of inquiry, which are described in more depth below.  First, I surveyed 
literature from practicing lawyers, such as client alerts and memoranda.  Then, 
I reviewed preliminary agreement cases in jurisdictions with high volumes of 
complex business litigation.  Finally, I conducted a series of interviews with 
practicing deal lawyers.  Each method of inquiry is described in more depth 
below. 
A. Practitioners’ Literature Survey 
Law firms with corporate practices often publish client alerts and 
memoranda.  In the ten years that it took the SIGA cases to wind its way 
through the Delaware courts, for instance, many practitioners issued alerts 
and memoranda to update their clients on the results of the case.  Because 
practitioners publish this literature in order to generate business, these alerts 
do not stop at analysis of the case: They also include high-level opinions and 
advice about how a case will shape the legal landscape, or how a case should 
inform practices and norms going forward. 
This practitioners’ literature is often overlooked as a research source, but 
is in fact a rich source of information.  In the case of preliminary agreements, 
practitioners’ literature provides a reasonable proxy for large-scale survey or 
interview data.  To survey the practitioners’ literature on preliminary 
agreements, this Article relied primarily on the digital archives of the 
Bloomberg database, which attempts a comprehensive collection of 
practitioners’ literature.  In addition, a general search of practitioners’ 
literature was conducted.  This yielded results from, for instance, the Harvard 
Corporate Governance Law Forum and the law firm Fried Frank’s analysis 
                                                
 137. See A.B.A., Rep. of the Committee on Comm. & Bus. Litig., at 1 (Winter 2007), 
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/newsletter_gratis/commercial_business
_litigation.pdf (“Most civil lawsuits settle.”). 
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archives, both of which are oft-cited and respected sources for practitioners 
and academics alike. 
B. Litigation Survey
A comprehensive survey was conducted of litigation in all state and
federal courts in New York and Delaware relating to preliminary agreement 
dispute in business transactions.  This Article focused on New York and 
Delaware because of the relatively high number of business disputes between 
sophisticated parties that are litigated in those forums.  The survey of these 
cases found that there were only 21 opinions published between the ten-year 
period from June of 1996 to June of 2006.  This is a very small number 
compared to the overall volume of private M&A deals.  While the exact 
number of private M&A deals is hard to count—precisely because they are 
private, and therefore not always disclosed—overall deal volume provides a 
rough benchmark.  In 2014—one of the years surveyed—companies 
announced 9,802 deals.138  Another survey suggests that in the last month of 
2016—just outside of the surveyed timeframe —106 private equity deals were 
announced.139  The very small number of opinions during the surveyed period 
supports interviewees’ accounts that very few preliminary agreements are 
disputed, and those that are disputed are very rarely litigated to opinion. 
C. Interviews
At the heart of this Article are the original interviews.  Preliminary
agreements are used in private M&A deals, where the terms of the deals and 
the preliminary agreements are not disclosed to the public.  Moreover, 
preliminary agreements are rarely litigated, so information about preliminary 
138. M&A Trends Report 2015, DELOITTE at 4 (Mar. 2015),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/au/Documents/mergers-
acqisitions/deloitte-au-ma-2015-trends-240415.pdf (“In 2014, merger and acquisition activity 
accelerated meaningfully with those factors well entrenched.  The number of deals in the U.S. 
rose 10 percent to 9,802.”). 
139. U.S. M&A News and Trends, FACTSET: FLASHWIRE US MONTHLY, at 1 (Jan.
2017), https://insight.factset.com [https://perma.cc/2HQG-8LTD] (“U.S. private equity 
activity decreased in December, down 2.8% from November.  There were 106 deals in 
December compared to 109 in November.”).  While not all private equity deals are private, 
many are.  In the absence of data on the number of private deals, data on private equity deals, 
like data on overall deal volume, provides a benchmark that shows that 21 cases is a very 
small fraction of deals. 
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agreements cannot be found in opinions or filings.  Original interviews are 
the best source for understanding this common deal practice.  
Interviews were conducted with twelve deal lawyers who have substantial 
M&A practices.  Most of the deal lawyers interviewed were trained in and 
practiced in New York or California, although a few interviewees were trained 
in or practiced in Virginia, Texas, or Illinois.  Seven of the interviewed deal 
lawyers had more than 20 years of experience advising M&A clients.  The 
interviewee with the fewest years of experience—seven—primarily advises 
clients on private M&A deals, which is the most relevant type of M&A deals 
for a study of preliminary agreements. All interviews were conducted by 
telephone, on a confidential basis, on the dates indicated.  All interviewees are 
attorneys whose primary practices are M&A, or who had many years M&A 
experience before moving into general corporate or hybrid M&A/business 
roles in-house.  All interviewees practiced at or were trained at Vault 50 firms.  
For brevity and anonymity, each attorney is identified within the text of the 
Article by reference to a reference term, which is noted below. 
Date Interviewee Reference Term 
New York Attorney Interviews 
May 7, 2016 Recently retired from top legal position at investment 
bank; previously M&A partner in New York; 25+ years of 
experience 
NY Firm Attorney I 
May 17, 2016 Senior M&A associate with experience in New York and 
Chicago; 12+ years of experience 
NY Firm Attorney II 
May 26, 2016 Senior M&A associate in New York; 15+ years of 
experience 
NY Firm Attorney III 
May 26, 2016 Senior M&A associate in New York; 7+ years of 
experience 
NY Firm Attorney IV 
Silicon Valley Attorney Interviews 
May 31, 2016 M&A partner in Silicon Valley; 20+ years of experience SV Firm Attorney I 
June 2, 2016 M&A partner in Silicon Valley; 25+ years of experience SV Firm Attorney II 
June 15, 2016 M&A partner in Silicon Valley; 25+ years of experience SV Firm Attorney III 
June 13, 2016 M&A partner in Silicon Valley; 25+ years of experience SV Firm Attorney IV 
June 20, 2016 M&A partner in Silicon Valley; 25+ years of experience SV Firm Attorney V 
In-House Attorney Interviews 
May 23, 2016 In-house counsel at Silicon Valley company; previously 
M&A attorney practicing in Silicon Valley and Virginia; 
10+ years of experience 
In-House Attorney I 
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May 25, 2016 In-house counsel at Texas company; previously senior 
corporate associate practicing in Texas (firms in in-house); 
20+ years of experience 
In-House Attorney II 
June 20, 2016 In-house counsel at Silicon Valley company; previously 
senior M&A associate at Silicon Valley firm; 10+ years of 
experience 
In-House Attorney III 
